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RECENT CASES
Constitutional Law-Criminal ProcedureCircuits Split over Application of Stone
v. Powell's "Opportunity for Full and

Fair Litigation"
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Stone v. Powell' the Supreme Court held that when a state
has provided an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of a fourth
amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial.' The Court
left open, however, the question of what "opportunity for full and
fair litigation" means, 3 and recently two courts gave conflicting answers to that question. The Second Circuit in Gates v. Henderson
concluded that a federal court should apply the Supreme Court's
Townsend v. Sain5 test; thus under the Second Circuit's view unless
a petitioner intentionally waives an opportunity to raise his fourth
amendment right, a state court must decide his constitutional claim
on the merits. The Fifth Circuit in O'Berry v. Wainwright,I on the
other hand, held that an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" is
provided even though a state court never decides a petitioner's constitutional question because the petitioner has failed to comply with
a state procedural requirement. Analysis of these cases requires a
brief study of the history of habeas corpus and a careful examination
of three recent United States Supreme Court cases.
II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

Although Congress has made little change in the habeas corpus
1. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976).
2. Id. at 3045- 46.
3. The only guidance the Court provided was to cite Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293
(1963), in footnote 36 to be read after the words, "where the state has provided for full and
fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim ....
" 96 S. Ct. at 3052.
4. No. 76-2065 (2d Cir. Jan. 12, 1977).
5. Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), provides a test by which federal habeas courts
determine whether state courts have granted a petitioner a full and fair evidentiary hearing;
see notes 19-20 infra and accompanying text.
6. 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. Feb. 11, 1977).
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statutes7 since 1867, when federal habeas corpus relief was extended
to state prisoners,8 Supreme Court interpretations of both the habeas corpus statutes and the United States Constitution have expanded the scope of the writ significantly. In the early twentieth
century, federal habeas corpus evolved from a limited inquiry into
whether the convicting state court had jurisdiction9 to a careful
determination of whether the applicant had been given an adequate
opportunity in state court to raise his constitutional claims.' This
expansionary trend continued in 1953 with Brown v. Allen," in
which a state prisoner applied for federal habeas corpus relief claiming that the state trial court erred in failing to quash his indictment
because racial discrimination had been involved in the selection of
grand jurors and a coerced confession had been admitted against
him. Despite apparently adequate state litigation of these issues,
the Supreme Court held that petitioner Brown was entitled to federal habeas consideration of his constitutional claims. Daniels v.
Allen, 12 a companion case of Brown, did retain one major barrier to
habeas relief for state prisoners by holding that reconsideration of
constitutional issues by federal courts was improper if the state
court's decision rested on the defendant's13 failure to comply with
legitimate state procedural requirements.
In 1963 the expansion of habeas corpus jurisdiction culminated
4 in which the Supreme Court overruled Daniels.
with Fay v. Noia,1
Fay held that federal habeas review was not barred by procedural
defaults incurred by a petitioner during state court proceedings and
thus cleared the last obstacle to habeas relief. The Fay Court conceded that a district court judge had discretion to deny relief to an
applicant who had "deliberately by-passed the orderly procedure of
the state courts,"' 5 but the opinion stressed that a knowing and
intelligent waiver was required 6 and that legal fictions would not be
7. The only significant amendment occurred in 1966 when Congress substantially codified and limited the holding of Townsend v. Sain; see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970).
8. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 1, 14 Stat. 385.
9. In re Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906).
10. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
11. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
12. Id.
13. See Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), under which a state procedural
default may prevent direct appellate review by the United States Supreme Court of a constitutional claim decided by a state court of last resort.
14. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
15. Id.
16. The Court stated that "an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege," the definition of waiver stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464
(1938), would furnish the controlling standard. 372 U.S. at 439.
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tolerated.' 7 Townsend v. Sain, also decided in 1963, provided a
standard for the review of state court findings required by Fay.
Townsend held that if a defendant had not made a knowing waiver
under Fay, a federal habeas court must hold an evidentiary hearing
unless the state court reliably found the relevant facts after a full
hearing. The Court listed six situations 9 that indicated lack of full
and fair state court litigation and stated that if a federal court found
any one of the six in a particular case, it must grant an evidentiary
hearing. 6 After Fay and Townsend habeas corpus jurisdiction re2
mained stable for over ten years. '
This stability was shaken by three 1976 Supreme Court decisions. The first was Estelle v. Williams, 22 in which the defendant
was tried, while wearing jail clothes, and convicted of assault. The
Supreme Court agreed with the lower federal courts that forcing a
defendant to be tried in jail clothes would violate the fourteenth
amendment. Yet the Court held that the defendant in Estelle had
the burden of informing the state court that he wished to be tried
in civilian clothes and that his failure to object was sufficient to
negate the presence of the compulsion necessary to establish a con24
stitutional violation.2s Dissenting, Justices Brennan and Marshall
noted that, without reason, the majority departed from the Fay v.
17. 372 U.S. at 439. In Henry v. Mississippi the Supreme Court reiterated that procedural defaults by a defendant in state courts would not preclude habeas corpus relief unless
the petitioner had deliberately bypassed a state court opportunity to raise his constitutional
claim.
18. 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
19. The six situations listed in Townsend are ones in which: (1) the state court did not
resolve the merits of the factual dispute; (2) the record does not fairly support the state courts'
factual determinations; (3) the state courts used an inadequate factfinding procedure; (4) the
habeas petition alleges newly discovered evidence; (5) the state courts did not develop evidence crucial to the proper consideration of the constitutional claim-unless there was
"inexcusable neglect" by the petitioner under Fay v. Noia; (6) it appears to the habeas court
for any other reason that the trier of fact did not afford the petitioner a full and fair hearing.
372 U.S. at 313.
20. The fifth situation in the Townsend test incorporates the Fay waiver standard; see
note 19 supra.
21. The holding of Fay v. Noia was approved explicitly by the Supreme Court as late
as 1975 in Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975). The only significant expansionary case
during this ten-year period after Fay and Townsend was Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S.
217 (1969), which held that federal habeas relief was available to both state and federal
prisoners to protect all constitutional rights related to the criminal trial process, including
the right to have unconstitutionally obtained evidence excluded from trial.
22. 425 U.S. 501 (1976).
23. The Court stated, "[O]nce a defendant has the assistance of counsel the vast array
of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, which must be made before and during trial rests
with the accused and his attorney." 425 U.S. at 512.
24. Id. at 515.
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Noia "deliberate by-pass" test by not basing its holding on a finding
of waiver. In the second 1976 decision, Francis v. Henderson,1 the
question was whether a state prisoner who failed to make a timely
challenge to the composition of the indicting grand jury could, after
his conviction, bring that challenge in a federal habeas corpus proceeding. Basing its opinion on Davis v. United States,2 1 which involved a federal prisoner, and "considerations of comity," 7 the
Court once more denied habeas relief. Justice Brennan, again dissenting,2 ' pointed to the majority's rejection of the "deliberate bypass" standard of Fay and noted that the majority opinions in
Estelle and Francis did not distinguish the constitutional rights
involved in those cases from other constitutional rights, such as
failure to challenge properly the introduction of unconstitutionally
seized evidence. Thus, Brennan argued, Estelle and Francis could
easily be extended to other constitutional issues, resulting in the
complete demise of Fay. In Stone v. Powell,2' the third 1976 decision, the Supreme Court made a limited but distinct break with
precedent.3 Stone held that a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an
unconstitutional search and seizure was introduced at his trial as
long as the state has provided an "opportunity for full and fair
litigation" of his fourth amendment claim." The Court, as noted
previously, did not define what kind of "opportunity" is required,
and again it neglected to indicate what impact Stone, Estelle, and
Francis would have on habeas corpus precedents such as Fay v.
Noia.
III.

THE INSTANT DECISIONS

Gates v. Hendersoninvolved a petitioner who was convicted of
murder in state court on the basis of fingerprint evidence that he
claimed was taken in an illegal search and seizure.32 At trial defense
25. 425 U.S. 536 (1976). Francis v.Henderson and Estelle v. Williams were decided on
the same day.
26. 411 U.S. 233 (1973). Davis held that habeas relief will be denied a federal prisoner
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970) if he fails to make a timely challenge to the composition of a

federal grand jury.
27. 425 U.S. at 539.
28. Id. at 542.
29. 96 S. Ct. 3037 (1976). Stone v. Powell was decided approximately two months after
Estelle and Francis.
30. Stone obviously overruled Kaufman v. United States; see note 22 supra.
31. 96 S. Ct. at 3045-46. The Court was concerned that federal redetermination of
search and seizure claims after full litigation by state courts would be an inefficient use of
judicial resources.
32. Petitioner's estranged wife died in her apartment of multiple stab wounds. Forty-
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counsel objected to the introduction of the evidence on the ambiguous ground that it violated petitioner's constitutional rights. Without ascertaining whether the objection was based on fourth amendment3 or fifth amendment 4 grounds and without making formal
findings concerning probable cause, the trial judge admitted the
evidence. After the district court denied habeas corpus relief,35 the
Second Circuit reversed, holding that Stone v. Powell did not foreclose federal habeas review since petitioner had not been granted
the requisite "opportunity for full and fair litigation." Stone indicated that Townsend v. Sain is relevant in determining whether an
adequate "opportunity" has been provided,36 and the court inferred
that the six situations listed in Townsend in which a state habeas
prisoner is entitled to an evidentiary hearing are also situations in
which an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of a search and
seizure claim has been denied. The Second Circuit found that two
of the situations listed in Townsend were present in the instant case:
first, the state courts had not made adequate factual or legal findings to support their conclusions;37 secondly, the trial court had
failed to develop evidence crucial to the determination of petitioner's constitutional claim, and this failure was not due to a
waiver under Fay v. Noia.3 Thus the court concluded that, under
the Townsend test, petitioner had not received an "opportunity for
full and fair litigation." Finally, the court observed that even if
petitioner's objection was inadequate for state law purposes, it did
five minutes after she was found, law enforcement officials stopped petitioner's car ten miles
from the murder scene for failure to dim his headlights. For reasons that were never revealed
at trial, petitioner was charged with first degree murder. His conviction occurred largely
because his fingerprints, taken at the police station, matched prints found on the windowsill
of the victim's apartment.
33. Petitioner's objection could have been based on fourth amendment grounds that his
fingerprints were obtained after an arrest made without probable cause. If so, Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 723-24 (1969), holds that such an objection is clearly valid. To rule on
such an objection, the trial judge would have needed to determine whether probable cause
existed for petitioner's arrest. (Davis was decided after petitioner's conviction.)
34. If petitioner objected on the ground that his being compelled to be fingerprinted
was a violation of the fifth amendment, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 764 (1966),
would invalidate that objection. (Schmerber was decided six months before appellant's trial.)
35. The appellant sought to raise his fourth amendment claim in a federal habeas
proceeding, but the federal district court denied relief, holding that appellant's objection was
not specific enough to raise the issue of "fruit of an unlawful search." No. 73-3865, slip op.
at 7 (S.D.N.Y. May 27, 1976).
36. See 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n.36.
37. The trial judge had overruled petitioner's objection without stating factual or legal
grounds, and none of the reviewing courts ever mentioned the objection.
38. The Townsend test uses the term "inexcusable neglect," which the courts have
interpreted to be a Fay v. Noia waiver or bypass; see note 20 supra. Fay v. Noia did not
contain the language "inexcusable neglect."
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not follow that this inadequacy would give the district court grounds
to deny habeas relief since, under Fay v. Noia, such power exists
only if the procedural default amounted to a deliberate bypass of
state remedies. In the instant case petitioner had not deliberately
bypassed state procedures nor waived his fourth amendment right
under Fay. In conclusion the court stated that neither Estelle v.
Williams nor Francis v. Henderson purports to affect Fay v. Noia
objection from the proand distinguished petitioner's lack of proper
39
cases.
those
in
involved
defaults
cedural
The petitioner in O'Berry v. Wainwright was convicted of rape
on the basis of evidence allegedly obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment. 0 In subsequent state court proceedings, petitioner
raised his search and seizure claim for the first time, but the state
court ruled that petitioner had not preserved the fourth amendment
claim for review because he had failed to object properly at trial.4
Thus no state court decided the constitutional claim. The federal
district court 2 granted petitioner's request for habeas corpus relief,
but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that Stone's "opportunity for
full and fair litigation" had been satisfied when the state court
directly confronted petitioner's fourth amendment claim but chose
43
to resolve the case on an adequate and independent state ground.
The court found that the state procedural rule requiring timely
objection to evidentiary rulings serves a legitimate state interest
and thus is an adequate and independent state ground that, under
39. One judge dissented, characterizing the majority opinion as "an artful effort to
circumvent Stone." He noted that the result of the decision was to release a convicted
murderer.
40. After petitioner was charged with two counts of rape, his car was towed to a police
storage area. The car was inspected and checked for fingerprints without a search warrant to
authorize the inspection. The inspecting detective determined that the backseat area recently
had been "wiped down clean." The testimony of this detective that the backseat of petitioner's car had been wiped was the only evidence that corroborated the prosecutrix's testimony that petitioner was the man who had raped her. 546 F.2d 1204, 1206-07 (1977).
41. Id. at 1209. Although petitioner did not appeal his conviction, he filed three separate
motions to vacate judgment and the sentence under FLA. CRIM. P. R. 1.850, the Florida
counterpart of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). Each motion was denied without an evidentiary
hearing. Petitioner then filed a state habeas corpus petition alleging, among other claims,
that his fourth amendment rights had been violated. The court denied the petition since
petitioner had not raised his fourth amendment objection at trial. 546 F.2d at 1207-09.
42. The petitioner filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the District Court for the
Southern District of Florida, which held that petitioner's fourth amendment right to be free
from warrantless searches and seizures had been violated. The court based its holding on
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). 546 F.2d at 1209.
43. The court added the words "at least where that state ground does not unduly
burden federal rights." 546 F.2d at 1216. The court found that the state procedural requirement involved in O'Berry did not unduly burden or interfere with federal rights.

19771

RECENT CASES

Henry v. Mississippi, precludes federal review. The court conceded
that support exists in Stone v. Powell for using the Townsend test
to define "opportunity for full and fair litigation" but refused to
adopt that test since it was intended to be used to determine
whether a petitioner had been granted a full and fair evidentiary
hearing. The Fifth Circuit found, however, that the only issues in
dispute before it were legal, not factual."
A vigorous dissent in O'Berry pointed out that Fay v. Noia held
state judgments resting on independent state procedural grounds to
be reviewable in federal habeas proceedings unless the petitioner
has deliberately bypassed his right to raise a federal constitutional
claim in state court. 5 The dissent stated that the majority's decision
directly conflicted with Fay's deliberate bypass test, even though
Stone v. Powell did not compel such a conflict, and would read
Stone's "opportunity" consistently with Fay so that noncompliance
with a state procedural rule would preclude habeas consideration of
a fourth amendment claim by federal courts only if that noncompliance was the product of a knowing decision by the defendant and
his counsel." Since it relied so strongly on Fay v. Noia, the dissent
made a brief study of Francis v. Henderson and mentioned Estelle
v. Williams, concluding that neither overrules Fay. 7 The dissent
noted the irony of the majority's reliance on Henry v. Mississippi
since, after the direct appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioner
Henry was released in a habeas corpus proceeding even though he
had failed to meet a state procedural rule by failing to raise his
fourth amendment claim in a timely fashion. Furthermore, the
dissent pointed out that the Supreme Court specifically stated in
Henry that a dismissal on adequate and independent state grounds
would not preclude habeas relief unless the petitioner had deliber44. 546 F.2d at 1218. In determining that Townsend was not the proper test to use, the
court looked to four points in Stone to reach its conclusion: (1) The court inferred from Stone
that when facts are not in dispute, "full and fair litigation" is satisfied even if only one state
court considers the fourth amendment claim. (2) The court noted that only an "opportunity"
is required by Stone; thus if petitioner deliberately bypassed state procedures for making his
constitutional objection known, habeas relief may be denied. (The court noted in note 14 that
Fay v. Noia has not been overruled.) (3) The court stated that Stone is based on the Supreme
Court's determination that the cost of the exclusionary rule outweighs its benefits. (4) The
court understood Stone to imply that state courts are as competent as federal courts in
protecting federal rights. The court then applied these four considerations to the instant case
and summarily concluded that the state had given petitioner the "opportunity" required by
Stone. Id. at 1212-15.
45. Id. at 1219.
46. Id. at 1220-21.
47. Id. at 1223.
48. Id. at 1222.
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ately bypassed his opportunity to raise the issue in state court. The
dissent noted that Stone was concerned with the cost of relitigating
search and seizure questions already decided by state courts, but
that in the instant case the petitioner never had his claim decided.
Since under these facts there was no "opportunity for full and fair
litigation," the dissent concluded that Stone should not preclude
relief. 9
IV.

COMMENT

The instant cases are the first attempts by federal appellate
courts to define "opportunity for full and fair litigation" for purposes of applying Stone v. Powell." The Second Circuit's adoption
in Gates v. Henderson of the Townsend v. Sain test has much to
commend it. The factors listed in Townsend seem especially appropriate in the habeas context since, if Stone v. Powell does not apply
to bar habeas review in a particular case, the federal court must
consider these same factors in deciding whether it must hold an
evidentiary hearing.' The test is familiar to the federal courts because they have applied it since 1963, and the state courts also are
familiar with its interpretation and therefore will be able to judge
accurately what procedures will pass muster. But most important,
use of the Townsend standard is supported by Stone itself. In addition to its footnote reference to Townsend v. Sain, the Stone opinion
stressed that federal review of search and seizure issues already
considered by a state court was inefficient and was not required by
the exclusionary rule implicit in the fourth amendment. Yet the
49. Id. at 1220.
50. The following cases have been decided on the basis of Stone v. Powell: Holmberg
v. Parratt, No. 76-1609 (8th Cir. Feb. 1, 1977); Chavez v. Rodriguez, 540 F.2d 500 (10th Cir.
1976); Caver v. Alabama, 537 F.2d 1333 (5th Cir. 1976); United States ex rel Petillo v. New
Jersey, 418 F. Supp. 686 (D.N.J. 1976); Roundtree v. Riddle, 417 F. Supp. 1274 (W.D. Va.
1976). Only Petillo addressed the issue of full and fair litigation. That court held that petitioner had been denied an opportunity for full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment
claim due to an unusual New Jersey procedural rule.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) provides that the state court factual findings "shall be
presumed correct" unless one of the Townsend factors is present. If the federal habeas court
determines that the state court did not meet the Townsend test for a full and fair evidentiary
hearing, the federal court must provide a hearing. If the Townsend test is used at both tiers
of the habeas court's inquiry, the district court can apply the test once to determine whether
Stone precludes relief. If the court finds an absence of full and fair state litigation, it does
not have to apply a second test to see if an evidentiary hearing must be held. (It should be
noted that the fifth situation listed in the Townsend test incorporates the Fay v. Noia waiver
test. Thus if the Townsend test is used in conjunction with Stone, an "opportunity for full
and fair litigation" would be provided (1) if the petitioner makes a knowing waiver under Fay
or (2) if his claim is fully litigated under the remainder of the Townsend test.)
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Stone Court did not indicate that anything less than direct judicial
decision of the constitutional issue would preclude habeas review,
for in such a situation the federal courts would be making an initial
consideration rather than performing a wasteful review.
On the other hand, O'Berry v. Wainwright's definition of
"opportunity" has less support in Stone than does the Townsend
test and directly conflicts with Fay. The Fifth Circuit extends Stone
much farther than necessary in holding that the Stone
"opportunity" may come and go without a defendant's knowledge
and without any court deciding whether a defendant is being held
in violation of the fourth amendment. Multiple determinations of
the same constitutional question, a Stone concern, is simply not
present in a situation like that in O'Berry. Moreover, assuming Fay
is still good law, as the Fifth Circuit concedes, the court obviously
is mistaken in relying on Henry v. Mississippi since Fay makes the
Henry rule inapplicable to habeas corpus review. This misplaced
reliance is at the very core of the court's holding, making its conclusion concerning what is required by Stone's "opportunity" difficult
to accept.
In addition to providing conflicting definitions of Stone's
"opportunity for full and fair litigation," the instant cases serve to
demonstrate that the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in
its recent habeas corpus decisions has been inadequate. The three
recently decided habeas cases have reduced substantially habeas
corpus jurisdiction of federal courts. These decisions fail, however,
to expressly overrule prior cases, such as Fay, or set new comprehensive guidelines; thus they present lower federal courts with inconsistent precedent to use in deciding current cases. The instant cases
pointedly reveal the current conflict over the viability of Fay v.
Noia, which is at the center of confusion in the habeas corpus area.
The problem is obvious in O'Berry v. Wainwright, for that decision
directly contradicts the Fay v. Noia deliberate bypass test although
the court explicitly recognizes that Estelle v. Henderson did not
overrule Fay. Such a radical inconsistency is especially distressing
in light of the well-reasoned dissent highlighting the majority's
error.
The uncertain viability of Fay also permeates the Second Circuit's adoption of the Townsend test in Gates v. Henderson, although one must look much deeper to find the conflict. As previously discussed, the Townsend test seems appropriately adopted
by the Second Circuit to define Stone's "opportunity for full and fair
litigation," but the Townsend criteria for determining whether a full
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and fair hearing has been held seems philosophically inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's present restrictive attitude toward habeas
jurisdiction. The Townsend test speaks of providing a federal hearing whenever state factual determinations are "not fairly supported
by the record"52 or whenever the state's factfinding procedure is
"not adequate to afford a full and fair hearing."5 3 Such a standard
implicitly requires close federal scrutiny of state court decisions, but
Stone leaves the impression that the burden of showing denial of an
adequate opportunity for full and fair litigation rests on the petitioner. 4 More importantly, the Townsend test is linked inextricably
to Fay v. Noia, which is currently in jeopardy in light of Estelle and
Francis. As the Second Circuit recognized, the fifth factor in the
Townsend test calls for a federal evidentiary hearing if evidence
crucial to the constitutional claim was not developed by the state,
although such a hearing is not required if the applicant waived, as
defined by Fay v. Noia, his constitutional rights. In Gates v.
Henderson the petitioner certainly did not knowingly waive his
fourth amendment right under Fay; therefore, if Fay is still good
law, the state court clearly failed the Townsend test, and the Gates
court is correct in not applying Stone v. Powell to bar relief. But the
search and seizure right in Gates is analogous to the due process
rights involved in Estelle v. Williams and Francis v. Henderson, in
which the defendants were denied habeas review because they had
failed to object according to state procedural rules.5 These cases
certainly reject the deliberate bypass standard of Fay for two constitutional rights. If their principles extend to all constitutional rights,
and thus overrule Fay, the Townsend test is changed drastically,
and the Second Circuit decided Gates incorrectly.
V.

CONCLUSION

The lack of guidance provided by Stone makes defining
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" difficult, but with the viability of Fay v. Noia in question, the task is impossible. The deliberate bypass standard of Fay is at the core of both definitions of
"opportunity for full and fair litigation" used in the instant cases:
52. 372 U.S. at 313.
53. Id.
54. See 96 S. Ct. at 3052 n.37.
55. The Supreme Court made no effort to distinguish the failure to challenge the composition of a grand jury or the wearing of jail clothes from other constitutional rights. Thus
the failure to challenge the introduction of unconstitutionally seized evidence as required by
state procedural rules seems vulnerable under these two cases.
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the Fifth Circuit's definition depends on the demise of Fay while the
Second Circuit's Townsend standard is based on and incorporates
Fay. Thus it is apparent that until the Supreme Court provides an
explicit definition of "opportunity for full and fair litigation" or sets
new limits on or overrules Fay v. Noia, lower federal courts will be
unable to ascertain whether Stone v. Powell should preclude habeas
review in a particular case."
JAMES

H.

LOKEY JR.

Military Law-The Role of the Military
Judiciary-The United States Court of Military
Appeals Strengthens Judicial Control of CourtsMartial and Expands Its Scope of Appellate
Review.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Code of Military Justice' attempts to strike a
delicate balance between traditional civilian concepts of an impartial, independent judicial system and the military's reliance on the
court-martial as an effective method by which a commander maintains discipline. Two recent decisions by the United States Court
of Military Appeals (COMA)' strengthen the authority of military
trial judges and expand relief powers at the appellate level.3 In
United States v. Ware' COMA abrogated the "accession doctrine"
56. The instant opinion reveals another potential problem. Unless the Supreme Court
reveals how far Estelle and Francisgo in overruling Fay v. Noia, defendants might raise sixth
amendment right to effective counsel issues since counsel will be unable to know which
constitutional rights must be raised in accordance with state procedures in order to be preserved for habeas review.
1. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1970) [hereinafter cited as UCMJ and Code].
2. COMA, composed of three civilian judges appointed by the President, is the court
of last resort in the military system. See UCMJ art. 67(a), 10 U.S.C. § 867(a) (1970).
3. Of the three types of courts-martial authorized by the Code - summary, general,
and special - summary courts-martial and many special courts-martial do not involve military trial judges or appellate review, and thus are not addressed specifically in this comment.
Minor offenses may be tried by a summary court-martial, consisting of a single officer, or by
a special court-martial board composed of at least three members without a judge presiding.
Because these courts may impose sentences of only limited severity, cases tried before them
do not reach COMA on appeal. The more serious offenses are tried before special courtsmartial boards with a judge presiding, or before general courts-martial boards, which may
impose sentences of sufficient severity to invoke appellate review. See UCMJ arts. 16-20, 10
U.S.C. §§ 816-820 (1970). See also note 35 infra and accompanying text.
4. 24 C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976).
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that had allowed the convening authority (usually the accused's
commander)5 to reverse the trial judge's dismissal of charges referred for court-martial. In McPhail v. United States' COMA
strengthened its appellate role by asserting jurisdiction to issue extraordinary writs to insure that lower courts and officials purporting
to act under the authority of the Code comply with applicable law.
Together these cases illustrate the court's belief that enhancing the
role of the military judiciary is essential to effectuate congressional
intent that actions taken by military commanders pursuant to the
Code achieve the proper objective of military discipline while protecting the rights of the accused.
II.

THE ACCESSION DOCTRINE AND THE MILITARY JUDGE

Article 62(a) of the Code authorizes the convening authority to
return to a court for its "reconsideration" any dismissal of a charge
that does not constitute a finding of not guilty.7 The Manual for
Courts-Martial,the authoritative procedural implementation of the
Code,8 interprets "reconsideration" to require that the trial judge
"accede" to the convening authority's disagreement on points of law
(as opposed to findings of fact) and proceed with the trial.' This
5. Unlike most civilian criminal courts that are permanently established with continuing jurisdiction, courts-martial are ad hoc tribunals assembled by the convening authority
and empowered to hear individual cases. The Code authorizes commanders at various echelons to act as convening authorities. See UCMJ arts. 22-24, 10 U.S.C. §§ 822-824 (1970).
In their role as convening authorities, military commanders supervise many functions in
the course of court-martial proceedings. After investigating suspected violations of military
law reported to him by subordinates, the convening authority decides whether criminal prosecution is warranted and, with the aid of his staff judge advocate, prepares the charges for
referral to the court. UCMJ arts. 30, 32-35, 10 U.S.C. §§ 830, 832-835 (1970). Other duties
incident to convening a court-martial include appointing the members of the court-martial
board who will serve as the jury, and insuring the presence of counsel. UCMJ arts. 25, 27, 10
U.S.C. §§ 825, 827 (1970). For a discussion of the convening authority's post-trial powers, see
note 35 infra.
6. 24 C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R. 15 (1976).
7. UCMJ art. 62(a), 10 U.S.C. § 862(a) (1970).
8. UCMJ art. 36, 10 U.S.C. § 836 (1970), authorizes the President to prescribe rules and
regulations for conducting courts-martial consistent with the Code. President Nixon issued
the present edition of the Manual in 1969 and President Ford amended it in 1975. Exec. Order
No. 11,476, 3 C.F.R. 132 (1966-1970 Compilation), amended by Exec. Order No. 11,835, 3A
C.F.R. 113 (1975).
67(f) (rev. ed. 1969) [hereinafter cited as MANUAL]
9. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL
provides in part: "To the extent that the matter in disagreement relates solely to a question
of law, . . . the military judge. . .will accede to the view of the convening authority. If the
matter relates to issues of fact, . . the military judge . . . will exercise his . . . discretion
in reconsidering the motion." As an example of a matter relating to a question of law, the
Manual cites a court's ruling that the charges do not allege an offense cognizable by a courtmartial. The Manual further suggests that scienter would be an issue of fact. Id.
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practice of acquiescence to the convening authority's opinion illustrates a vestige of the control over military justice fomerly exercised
by the commander. Historically, command control of courts-martial
was recognized as a necessary adjunct of the commander's responsibility to maintain discipline, and his personal dominance was both
expected and accepted.I In sharp contrast to the convening authority's traditional control, military judicial officers have possessed
only secondary authority in the conduct of courts-martial." Although the Code, enacted in 1950, restrained capricious abuse by
the commander 2 and vested the judicial officer with some supervisory control over the court-martial board and trial proceedings, 3 the
continuing spectre of unlawful command influence" persuaded Congress to recognize the desirability of firm judicial control of courtmartial proceedings. 5 By amendments to the Code in the Military
10. See generally Schiesser & Benson, A Proposalto Make Courts-MartialCourts: The
Removal of Commanders from Military Justice, 7 TEXAS TECH. L. REv. 559, 559-63 (1976);
West, A History of Command Influence on the Military JudicialSystem, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REv.
1, 1-20 (1970).
11. Prior to 1920 there was no requirement that any officer exercising a judicial function
be included in courts-martial boards. Statutory reforms in military justice following World
War I provided that a "law member" be assigned to every general court-martial, but this
official had little judicial authority. Stevenson, The InherentAuthority of the MilitaryJudge,
17 A.F.L. REv. 1, 2-3 (Summer 1975).
12. The debates over enactment of the Code centered on the proper role of the commanding officer in judicial processes. Interests in the importance of discipline and the necessity of command control in military matters competed with fears that military commanders
would tend to discount the importance of guaranteeing the accused a fair and impartial trial.
See Morgan, The Background of the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice, 6 VAND. L. REv. 169,
173-74, 184 (1953). The resulting compromise retained command "control" by investing the
commander with clearly defined responsibilities and powers in the administration of military
criminal law. See note 5 supra. See also Priest v. Koch, 19 C.M.A. 293, 295-96, 41 C.M.R.
293, 295-b6 (1970). On the other hand, specific safeguards concerning pretrial restraint, compulsory self-incrimination, pretrial investigations, trial procedures, and post-conviction review were provided to eliminate the use of courts-martial as mere disciplinary boards. See
Ward, UCMJ - Does It Work? 6 VAND. L. REv. 186, 194-209 (1953).
13. See Act of May 5, 1950, ch. 169, § 1 (arts. 26 & 51), 64 Stat. 117, 124. Although the
Code abolished the legal officer's status as a voting member of the board, and changed his
title to "law officer," his transformation from juror to judge was incomplete. Certain of his
rulings were still subject to the objections of court members, and the president of the court,
the highest ranking officer on the board, was still considered the presiding officer. Stevenson,
supra note 11, at 4-5.
14. Unlawful "command influence" generally refers to those actions by a commanding
officer that threaten the impartiality of the trial, such as attempting to influence the military
jury to return a guilty verdict. See generally Schiesser & Benson, supra note 10, at 564;
Wacker, The Unreviewable Courts-Martial Conviction: Supervisory Relief Under the All
Writs Act from the United States Court of MilitaryAppeals, 10 HRv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 33,
36 n.17 (1975); West, supra note 10, at 1,2. Unlawful command influence was proscribed
expressly by article 37 of the Code. See UCMJ art. 37, 10 U.S.C. § 837 (1970).
15. See S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4501, 4504.
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Justice Act of 1968,6 Congress established an independent military
judiciary composed of trial judges specifically authorized to preside
over courts-martial with functions and powers similar to those of
federal judges.1 7 Although Congress attempted to vest in military
judges the complete responsibility for the impartial adjudication of
criminal liability in courts-martial, it nevertheless failed to amend
article 62(a) or to address the continued validity of the accession
doctrine.
Despite the increased authority of the military trial judiciary
effected by the 1968 amendments and by case history,'8 COMA
consistently upheld the convening authority's purported power
under article 62(a) to reverse a dismissal of charges by the judge.
When the defendant in Priest v. Koch'" argued that the accession
doctrine exceeded the convening authority's power under article
62(a) to force "reconsideration" of a court's ruling, COMA held that
denying the reversal power of the convening authority would create
''an impasse between an unyielding trial court and a persistent
convening authority."2 The defendant in United States v. Frazier2 '
contended that the convening authority's reversal power extended
solely to questions of law22 and that a judge's dismissal after an
evidentiary hearing on speedy trial amounted to a mixed question
of law and fact. COMA agreed that the convening authority could
not make new findings of fact based on the evidence, but nevertheless held that the convening authority could determine either that
16.

Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1335 (1968) (amending 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-940 (1964)).

17. The term "military judge" was substituted for "law officer," and the military judge
was empowered specifically to preside over courts-martial. The judge was authorized to try
cases without board members at the request of the accused, and to conduct out-of-court
hearings to consider motions. The amendments also stressed the finality of the judge's rulings
on questions of law and interlocutory matters arising during the course of the trial. In addition, military trial judges assigned to general courts-martial became responsible only to the
Judge Advocate General. UCMJ arts. 16, 26(c), 39, 10 U.S.C. §§ 816, 826(c), 839 (1970). See
also Stevenson, supra note 11, at 5-6.

18. Many of COMA's early decisions expressed concern for the independence of the
military judge or law officer. See, e.g., United States v. Knudson, 4 C.M.A. 587, 16 C.M.R.
161 (1954) (improper for convening authority to overrule a law officer's grant of continuance).
See generally 27 JAG J.272, 282-83 (1973); 59 MIL. L. Rav. 215, 222-27 (1973).

19. 19 C.M.A. 293, 41 C.M.R. 293 (1970).
20. Id. at 298, 41 C.M.R. at 298. The court relied upon its earlier decision in United
States v. Boehm, 17 C.M.A. 530, 38 C.M.R. 328 (1968), which held that convening authorities
could reverse dismissals granted by special courts-martial with law officers present. Although

article 62(a) does not distinguish courts-martial presided over by judges and courts-martial
consisting of only board members, the defendant in Priest argued unsuccessfully that the
Military Justice Act's enhancement of military judges required reconsideration of Boehm. 19

C.M.A. at 296, 41 C.M.R. at 296. See note 3 supra.
21. 21 C.M.A. 444, 45 C.M.R. 218 (1972).
22.

See note 9 supra and accompanying text.
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the facts established by the judge were not supported by the evidence, or that the facts supported by the evidence did not justify
the dismissal as a matter of law.23 Thus the Frazier decision minimized the importance of the Manual's law/fact distinction and
strengthened the power of the convening authority to countermand
judicial determinations.
COMA recently abolished the accession doctrine in United
States v. Ware.2 4 The trial judge had dismissed the charges because
of the government's failure to provide the accused speedy disposition of his case. The trial counsel 25 appealed the decision to the
convening authority, who determined that the judge's findings of
fact did not justify the ruling as a matter of law. The judge acceded
to the views of the convening authority, and the trial proceeded,
resulting in petitioner's conviction. 2 On appealP COMA reversed
the conviction, holding that article 62(a) allowed the convening authority to do no more than reconvene the court and submit the
dismissal of the charges for reconsideration by the judge.2" While
finding the chief support for its ruling in the "clear and unambiguous language" of article 62(a), COMA noted that appeals by the
government in federal criminal practice are disfavored and therefore
refused to sanction reversals by the convening authority absent specific congressional approval.2 9 Finally, COMA concluded that the
accession doctrine was irreconcilable with the Military Justice Act's
creation of the military judge and its institution of a trial judiciary
independent of command control."
23. 21 C.M.A. at 446, 45 C.M.R. at 220.
24. 24 C.M.A. 102, 51 C.M.R. 275 (1976).
25. The prosecutor in a court-martial is called the trial counsel. See UCMJ art. 27, 10
U.S.C. § 827 (1970).
26. The judge's accession was not the result of his "reconsideration" of the evidence;
in fact, the judge heard further evidence on a second motion that indicated an even stronger
case for dismissal. 24 C.M.A. at 103, 51 C.M.R. at 276.
27. COMA had granted defendant's petition for review of the affirmation of his conviction by the Navy Court of Military Review. See UCMJ art. 67(b)(3), 10 U.S.C. § 867(b)(3)
(1970); note 35 infra.
28. COMA held that the part of 67(f) of the Manual that allowed the convening
authority to reverse judicial dismissals exceeded the authority of article 62(a) and thus was
void. See notes 7-9 supra. COMA has the power to void provisions of the Manual that it finds
irreconcilable with the Code. See United States v. Douglas, 24 C.M.A. 178, 51 C.M.R. 397
(1976); United States v. Johnpier, 12 C.M.A. 90, 30 C.M.R. 90 (1961).
29. Two weeks after the Ware decision, in United States v. Rowel, 24 C.M.A. 137, 51
C.M.R. 327 (1976), Chief Judge Fletcher recommended congressional action to provide the
government with a means to appeal an adverse ruling of the trial judge. Id. at 138, 51 C.M.R.
at 328.
30. The court asserted:
Finally, we note that in the Military Justice Act of 1968, in amending the UCMJ,
Congress caused a metamorphosis of the law officer into a military judge and created a
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The Ware decision correctly concludes that the accession doctrine was an anamoly of military law after the establishment of a
military judiciary in 1968. In addition the decision clearly eliminates the incongruity between established practice and statutory
language in favor of the judge.3 ' If the convening authority and the
judge reach opposite conclusions of law, notions of impartial justice
require preference of the judicial decision over the opinion of the
convening authority who has initiated the prosecution.3 2 Although
the practical impact of Ware is minimal,33 the decision indicates a
full recognition by COMA of congressional attempts to establish
strong judicial authority at the trial level and to eliminate the ves3
tiges of command influence in court-martial proceedings. '

II. COMA's

APPELLATE REVIEW OF COURTS-MARTIAL

The Code generally limits COMA's appellate jurisdiction to
cases in which the sentence imposed directs a punitive discharge or
trial judiciary independent of the line command. It appears to us to be inherently
inconsistent with the action of Congress in creating an independent judicial structure
in the military, to strain the clear meaning of Article 62(a) to the point of permitting
the lay convening authority to reverse a ruling of law by the trial judge. We decline to
do so.
24 C.M.A. at 105-06, 51 C.M.R. at 278-79 (original emphasis) (footnotes omitted). COMA's
emphasis on lay personnel reversing judicial decisions perhaps was unduly harsh since commanders confer with legally-qualified staff judge advocates on all legal matters. See UCMJ
arts. 6(b), 34(a), 10 U.S.C. §§ 806(b), 834(a) (1970). The clear intent of the court, however,
is to prevent interference by members of the command staff, as well as intervention by any
non-legal officer, during court-martial proceedings.
31. The language of the opinion addresses only the confrontation between the convening
authority and the military judge, and does not mention the effect of its ruling on a dismissal
by a court-martial board sitting without a judge. See note 3 supra.
32. See note 5 supra.The Code and the Manual provide procedures designed to insure
that the commander convening the court-martial is not involved personally in the offense
alleged, and is sufficiently remote from the accused to facilitate objectivity. See UCMJ arts.
22(b), 23(b), 10 U.S.C. §§ 822(b), 823(b) (1970); MANUAL, supra note 9, chap. VII. By convening the court and referring charges, however, the convening authority already has determined
that the charges are correct in law and that the circumstances warrant court-martial action.
Final appellate authority from an opposite decision by the judge, therefore, should not lie
with the authority making the initial prosecutorial decision. See note 29 supra.
33. See 59 MIL. L. Rav. 215, 230 (1973), which discusses the infrequent use of the
accession doctrine.
34. Recent cases regarding procedural errors committed by the judge during courtsmartial sessions indicate COMA's determination that the trial judiciary play the key role in
military courtrooms. See, e.g., United States v. Shamberger, 24 C.M.A. 203, 51 C.M.R. 448
(1976) (obligation of judge to prevent improper argument by trial counsel); United States v.
McGee, 23 C.M.A. 591, 50 C.M.R. 856 (1975) (duty of judge to instruct the court members
sua sponte on lesser included offenses suggested by the evidence). See generally Cooper, The
Military Judge: More Than a Mere Referee, ARMY LAW. 1 (Aug. 1976). For a discussion of
COMA's recognition of the judge's inherent powers concerning pretrial and interlocutory
matters, see Stevenson, supra note 11, at 13-38.
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3
Although the establishment of
confinement for at least one year5.
military appellate courts was considered to be one of the more revolutionary and controversial innovations effected by enactment of
the Code in 1950,36 the prerequisite of a jurisdictional sentence precluded judicial review upon the petition of the accused in the vast

35. The Code vests primary judicial appellate power in separate Courts of Military
Review (CMR), composed of both military and civilian judges and established within each
branch of the service. The Judge Advocate General (JAG) of each branch submits to the
appropriate CMR the record of every court-martial that imposes a sentence extending to
confinement for one year or punitive discharge/dismissal from the service. In addition the
JAG must submit to a CMR all cases imposing the death penalty or affecting generals and
admirals, although he may in his discretion submit any general court-martial, regardless of
sentence, for review. See UCMJ arts. 66(a)-66(b), 69, 10 U.S.C. § 866(a)-866(b), 869 (1970).
See also note 3 supra. Except for cases involving generals and admirals or the death penalty,
further review may be had by COMA only if the JAG so directs, or if COMA grants the
petitioner's request for further review under article 67(b)(3). See generally UCMJ art. 67(b),
10 U.S.C. § 867(b) (1970). Because COMA may review a case only after prior action by a
CMR, the jurisdictional requirement for review by a CMR likewise restricts the number of
cases which may reach COMA.
Unlike the limitations on judicial appellate review, however, the Code provides for extensive nonjudicial review of each court-martial at the command level. After every trial the
record is forwarded to the convening authority, who reviews the case with his staff judge
advocate and approves only such findings and sentence as he finds correct in law and fact,
and as he in his discretion determines should be approved. UCMJ arts. 60, 61, 64, 10 U.S.C.
§§ 860, 861, 864 (1970). Because the convening authority may not disturb findings of acquittal
nor increase sentences, this review is benign in nature. If the convening authority disapproves
the findings or sentence, he may order a rehearing before a new court-martial board, but a
more severe punishment may not be imposed, nor may the defendant be tried for an offense
of which he was acquitted by the first court-martial. UCMJ art. 63, 10 U.S.C. § 863 (1970).
The records of general courts-martial are then forwarded to the appropriate JAG for possible
submission to a CMR. UCMJ arts. 65(a), 69, 10 U.S.C. 44 865(a), 869 (1970). If the sentence
of any court-martial as approved by the convening authority includes confinement for one
year or punitive discharge, the record is further reviewed by a superior commander or sent
directly to the JAG for submission to a CMR. All other special and summary courts-martial
records are reviewed by a military lawyer. UCMJ arts. 65(b), 65(c), 10 U.S.C. §§ 865(b),
865(c) (1970). For a discussion of the three kinds of courts-martial, see note 3 supra.
36. During the 1949 congressional hearings, the UCMJ's primary objectives of protecting servicemen, promoting uniformity, and increasing public confidence in military justice
coalesced into one overriding concern: the elimination of improper command influence, which
long had plagued military justice. A civilian appellate court was seen as a key to controlling
command influence. Wacker, supra note 14, at 36-37. Opposition to a judicial appellate
scheme, especially one directed by civilian judges, came from military traditionalists who
questioned the delay concomitant with judicial review. They argued that military effectiveness would be unduly restricted by non-military minds unable to appreciate fully the military
problems involved in court-martial cases. Some spokesmen predicted that a civilian appellate
court would not be able to cope with the tremendous number of cases tried annually. See
generally Crump, PartII: A History of the Structureof MilitaryJustice in the United States,
1921-1966, 17 A.F.L. REV. 55, 66-68 (1975); Walker & Niebank, The Court of Military Appeals-Its History, Organizationand Operation, 6 VmD. L. REV. 228, 228 (1953); Willis, The
United States Court of Military Appeals: Its Origin, Operationand Future,55 MIL. L. REv.
39, 54-63 (1972).
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majority of cases.3" Despite this limited grant of jurisdiction, early

decisions by COMA reflected its intention to act as the supreme
court of the military judicial system in protecting the rights of military defendants,3" and the court recognized the possibility of
"extraordinary proceedings" outside the normal appellate scheme
of the Code. 9 As an example of extraordinary proceedings traditionally available to federal appellate courts, COMA cited the All Writs
Act, which authorizes all courts established by Congress to issue
writs "necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions .. ."40 After several years of alluding to its incidental powers
in dicta,4" COMA unequivocally embraced the authority to issue
writs in aid of its jurisdiction under the All Writs Act in United
States v. Frischholz 2 Although the petitioner had exhausted all
ordinary appellate remedies provided by the Code,4 3 COMA declared that it should not be precluded from reviewing his case since
the fundamental question of military jurisdiction was at issue."
Because the petitioner in Frischholz had been dismissed from
the service as a result of his conviction, Frischholz established
37. In 1972 one commentator calculated that COMA had the opportunity to review only
6% of the courts-martial conducted under the Code. Willis, supra note 36, at 76 n.189.
38. United States v. Armbruster, 11 C.M.A. 596, 598, 29 C.M.R. 412, 414 (1960); United
States v. Clay, 1 C.M.A. 74, 77, 1 C.M.R. 74, 77 (1951). See also United States v. Culp, 14
C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963) (COMA has the responsibility to decide constitutional
claims); United States v. Holloway, 10 C.M.A. 595, 28 C.M.R. 161 (1959) (COMA has inherent authority to note plain error on review); United States v. Bouie, 9 C.M.A. 228, 26 C.M.R.
8 (1958) (COMA may correct errors that result in a miscarriage of justice or undermine the
public reputation of military judicial proceedings).
39. United States v. Best, 4 C.M.A. 581, 584-85, 16 C.M.R. 155, 158-59 (1954).
40. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970). In federal practice, the All Writs Act has been utilized
by courts to issue such common law writs as prohibition, mandamus, error coram nobis,
habeas corpus, and certiorari. Jurisdiction conferred by the All Writs Act is ancillary to and
dependent upon primary jurisdiction independently conferred by other statutes. See Rankin,
The All Writs Act and the MilitaryJudicial System, 53 MIL. L. REv. 103, 103, 105-14 (1971);
Wacker, supra note 14, at 57-73.
41. See In re Taylor, 12 C.M.A. 427, 31 C.M.R. 13 (1961); United States v. Tavares, 10
C.M.A. 282, 27 C.M.R. 356 (1959); United States v. Buck, 9 C.M.A. 290, 26 C.M.R. 70 (1958).
42. 16 C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966). Rejecting the government's argument that
the All Writs Act applied only to Article II courts, COMA concluded that by choosing the
statutory language "all courts established by Act of Congress" for the All Writs Act, Congress
intended to include legislative courts under Article I. Id. at 152, 36 C.M.R. at 308.
43. Petitioner had been convicted in 1960, and a CMR had affirmed. COMA denied his
petition for review under article 67(b)(3). See note 35 supra.
44. COMA also held that article 76 of the Code, which affords finality to all cases when
appellate review is terminated, did not bar relief sought in the nature of a writ error coram
nobis. 16 C.M.A. at 151, 36 C.M.R. at 307. See also UCMJ art. 76, 10 U.S.C. § 876 (1970).
Holding that extraordinary relief available by writ could not be used as a substitute for
appeal, COMA nevertheless denied relief because the issues raised by the petition could have
been presented on original review. Id. at 153, 36 C.M.R. at 309.
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COMA's jurisdiction to review by writ a conviction that involved
the jurisdictional sentence required by the Code for normal appellate review2 5 In Gale v. United States,46 however, COMA expanded
its scope of review to entertain a petition for relief from prosecution"
sought priorto the completion of trial or imposition of sentence. The
government contended in Gale that, because COMA obtains no
appellate jurisdiction prior to the imposition of a jurisdictional sentence, the court had no power to grant interlocutory relief under
the All Writs Act, which requires that any writ be "in aid of the

court's jurisdiction."48 The court rejected that argument by emphasizing congressional intent that COMA exercise a general supervisory power over the military justice system.49 Concerns for maintaining COMA's supervisory role likewise prevailed in United States
v. Bevilacqua,50 in which the court found jurisdiction to hear a peti-

tion for extraordinary post-conviction relief even though the sentence imposed did not meet the jurisdictional requirements of the
Code. Reluctant to force military defendants to seek relief by writ
of habeas corpus from the federal courts, COMA refused to allow the

restrictions of the Code to impair its potential ability to protect the

5
constitutional rights of members of the armed forces .
Less than one year after Bevilacqua, however, in United States
v. Snyder,52 COMA severely limited its recently expanded authority
to entertain petitions under the All Writs Act in cases lacking the
requisite jurisdictional sentence. Although the petitioner's prayer
for post-conviction relief addressed the fundamental question of

subject matter jurisdiction of the court-martial,53 COMA held that
45. See note 35 supra.
46. 17 C.M.A. 40, 37 C.M.R. 304 (1967).
47. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari and/or writ of prohibition. Id. at 42,
37 C.M.R. at 306.
48. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
49. COMA nevertheless denied relief, concluding that the circumstances did not warrant a premature review of issues that could be raised during the normal course of appellate
review. 17 C.M.A. at 44, 37 C.M.R. at 308.
50. 18 C.M.A. 10, 39 C.M.R. 10 (1968).
51. Having established jurisdiction to issue the writ, COMA nevertheless denied relief
because of the absence of an alleged denial of a fundamental right afforded by the Constitution or the Code or other grounds justifying extraordinary relief. Id. at 12, 39 C.M.R. at 12.
52. 18 C.M.A. 480, 40 C.M.R. 192 (1969).
53. See United States v. Frischholz, 16 C.M.A. 150, 36 C.M.R. 306 (1966), in which the
court asserted that it never should be precluded from review of a challenge to the jurisdiction
of a court-martial. In Snyder the petitioner's request for a writ of error coram nobis alleged
that the court-martial lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offense of adultery. 18 C.M.A. at
481, 40 C.M.R. at 193. Under the principle of O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969), a
court-martial has jurisdiction only if the alleged crime is service-connected, i.e., if the illegal
activity is related to the accused's military status.
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it had no jurisdiction to grant relief when the sentence imposed did
not meet the Code's jurisdictional requirement for ordinary appellate review.-4 While affirming that the All Writs Act authorized the
exercise of powers ancillary to its jurisdiction under the Code,
COMA noted that recent legislation allowing a defendant to petition the Judge Advocate General for extraordinary relief in cases not
subject to judicial review precluded the court's jurisdiction over
cases not amenable to normal appellate review. Although COMA
occasionally exercised its interlocutory and post-conviction writ
powers after Snyder,-" the preclusion of post-conviction petitions for
54. Petitioner's sentence as approved by the convening authority extended only to a
reduction in rank. 18 C.M.A. at 481, 40 C.M.R. at 193. See note 35 supra.
55. 18 C.M.A. at 483, 40 C.M.R. at 195. The Military Justice Act of 1968 amended
article 69 to permit a defendant convicted in any court-martial not reviewed by an appellate
court to petition the JAG to vacate or modify his conviction for good cause shown, including
lack of jurisdiction in the convicting court-martial. See UCMJ art. 69, 10 U.S.C. § 869 (1970),
as amended by Military Justice Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-632, 82 Stat. 1342. The Senate
Report on the amendment states that a decision to remove the burden of a conviction was
based on traditional legal grounds and thus required a "judicial" determination, but it does
not explain why this relief power was entrusted to a "quasi-judicial" Judge Advocate General.
See S. REP. No. 1601, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 15, reprintedin [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWs

4501, 4515.

56. Relying upon federal court doctrine recognizing the availability of the All Writs Act
to a court ancillary to its "past" or "future" jurisdiction, COMA, on the authority of Gale
and Frischholz, infrequently granted petitions for relief in cases that previously had qualified
for ordinary appellate review or that could potentially come before the court if a conviction
and jurisdictional sentence were obtained and sustained by nonjudicial review and a CMR.
See note 35 supra. See generally Wacker, supra note 14, at 59-63. Petitions that the court
considered to present circumstances sufficiently "extraordinary" to exercise its ancillary
powers generally requested interlocutory writs in the nature of prohibition to enjoin a courtmartial clearly lacking jurisdiction to try the defendant, or writs in the nature of habeas
corpus or mandamus to release the petitioner from a patently illegal restraint or conviction.
See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, 23 C.M.A. 570, 50 C.M.R. 789 (1975) (directing petitioner's release from confinement pending re-trial after COMA had reversed his conviction);
Rhoades v. Haynes, 22 C.M.A. 189, 46 C.M.R. 189 (1973) (ordering a convening authority to
conclude his tardy review of the trial record so that the appellate process might continue);
Asher v. United States, 22 C.M.A. 6, 46 C.M.R. 6 (1972) (writ of error coram nobis granted
to reverse a conviction which COMA had previously refused to review under article 67(b)(3));
Collier v. United States, 19 C.M.A. 511, 42 C.M.R. 113 (1970) (vacating a convening authority's order illegally confining the petitioner following the conviction but prior to ordinary
appellate review by COMA); Fleiner v. Koch, 19 C.M.A. 630 (1969) (pending court-martial
charges dismissed by COMA due to a clear lack of the trial court's jurisdiction). Petitions
for relief usually were refused, however, because of the judicial policy that disfavors piecemeal
appeals, or for failure to state circumstances so extraordinary that the normal trial and
appellate process could not grant appropriate relief. See, e.g., Henderson v. Resor, 20 C.M.A.
165, 43 C.M.R. 5 (1970) (mere inconvenience of standing trial insufficient to seek termination
of court-martial proceedings); Hallinan v. Lamont, 18 C.M.A. 652 (1968) (alleged harassment
of the accused prior to trial may be remedied by appropriate motion at trial level).
The court rarely discussed how granting the relief sought was "in aid" of its jurisdiction.
See note 40 supra and accompanying text. In Gallagher v. United States, 22 C.M.A. 191, 46
C.M.R. 191 (1973), COMA previously had denied petitioner's application for regular appel.
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extraordinary relief in the absence of a jurisdictional sentence indicated a significant diminution of COMA's perception of its supervisory authority as expressed in Frischholz, Gale, and Bevilacqua.
COMA recently clarified its jurisdictional powers and its role
in the military justice system in McPhail v. United States.57 The
trial judge had determined that the accused's alleged offenses were
not connected with his membership in the Air Force and thus dismissed the charges for lack of military jurisdiction."' The convening
authority returned the record of the proceedings to the judge and
indicated his disagreement with the ruling. Acceding to the decision
of the convening authority, the judge tried the petitioner and sentenced him to restriction to base and performance of hard labor
without confinement. Because the sentence did not include a discharge or confinement for at least one year, the petitioner had no
recourse to the military judicial appellate system. When his prayer
for extraordinary relief to the Judge Advocate General was denied,"
petitioner sought a writ of certiorari or error coram nobis5 from
COMA. Relying on Snyder, the government contended that because
the case never could reach COMA by normal appellate review, any
contemplated action by the court would not be in aid of its jurisdiction.
COMA held that it had jurisdiction to review the petitioner's
late review under article 67(b)(3) but had erroneously failed to note a fundamental error in
the conviction. Extraordinary relief thus was warranted because of the court's responsibility
to grant a meaningful review. In Chenoweth v. Van Arsdall, 22 C.M.A. 183, 46 C.M.R. 183
(1973), the court explained that post-conviction relief granted prior to a petitioner's request
for regular appellate consideration under article 67(b)(3) would aid the court's ability eventually to grant meaningful review otherwise unavailable when the petitioner remained in illegal
restraint during the course of regular appellate review. Interlocutory relief terminating clearly
illegal court-martial proceedings would aid COMA's future jurisdiction by preventing a waste
of time and energy involved throughout the trial and appellate level. Id. at 187-88, 46 C.M.R.
187-88. Subsequent decisions, however, reflect a more restrictive view of the "in aid" requirement. See, e.g., Hendrix v. Warden, 23 C.M.A. 227, 49 C.M.R. 146 (1974). For a critical
analysis of post-Snyder decisions by COMA, see Rankin, supra note 40, at 110-35; Wacker,
supra note 14 at 51-57.
57. 24 C.M.A. 304, 52 C.M.R. 15 (1976).
58. See O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
59. See note 55 supra.
60. While the trial judge's order of dismissal was still under consideration by the convening authority, petitioner had applied to COMA for a writ of prohibition to prevent the
convening authority from reviewing the judge's decision. COMA had denied the petition. In
the instant opinion COMA held that error coram nobis is the appropriate remedy only when
the court's earlier disposition of a case is flawed because the court misperceived or improperly
assessed a material fact. Since article 62(a) allows the convening authority to review a dismissal and submit it to the trial judge for reconsideration,the writ of prohibition requested
would have been improper. Thus there were no grounds for error coram nobis. 24 C.M.A. at
306-07, 52 C.M.R. at 17-18.
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conviction. The court acknowledged that, although the Code limited its ordinary appellate power, a review of the legislative history
of the Code indicated that Congress intended the court to perform
a supervisory function over the administration of military justice.
Citing language of the United States Supreme Court that acknowledged COMA's primary responsibility for the integrity of military
justice,6 ' the court concluded that its role as the highest court in the
military justice system demands that it have the power to issue
supervisory writs to insure that all courts and persons purporting to
2
act under the authority of the Code comply with applicable law.
Accordingly, in the instant case a writ would issue to the Judge
Advocate General of the Air Force to vacate the petitioner's conviction. 3
Rejecting Snyder's conclusion that COMA's ancillary powers
are limited to cases contemplated by the Code's scheme of regular
appellate review, McPhail's expansive concept of supervisory jurisdiction provides a more practical framework for reconciling
COMA's writ powers with the Code's delineation of COMA's jurisdictional grant. The court had correctly reasoned in Snyder that the
All Writs Act was ancillary in nature and could not create jurisdiction and thus felt compelled to dismiss as dictum Bevilacqua's asserted power of review over a completed case lacking a sufficient
jurisdictional sentence. The Gale and Frischholz decisions, however, survived Snyder, and COMA apparently retained the power
both to grant interlocutory writs before the sentence was imposed
and to review for error convictions that included the jurisdictional
sentence and either had been or would be before the court during
regular appellate review. 4 As a result of Gale, Frischholz, and
Snyder, defendants who obtained a trial continuance and appealed
61. 24 C.M.A. at 309, 52 C.M.R. at 20 (citing Noyd v. Bond, 395 U.S. 683, 695 (1969)).
62. The court pointed out that its actions in Gale and Bevilacqua were consistent with
the concept of action in aid of its jurisdiction as the supreme court of the military and that
Snyder had limited unnecessarily the ability to grant relief through supervisory writs. 24
C.M.A. at 308, 310, 52 C.M.R. at 19, 21. For a discussion of the concept-and applications of
the supervisory mandamus in several Supreme Court cases and its amenability with COMA's
role in the military justice system, see Wacker, supra note 14, at 57-91.
63. COMA concluded that, even before the abolition of the accession doctrine in Ware,
findings of the judge could not be reexamined when there was ample evidence to support his
ruling. 24 C.M.A. at 306, 52 C.M.R. at 17. In view of the latitude granted the convening
authority to ignore findings of the military judge in United States v. Frazier, 21 C.M.A. 444,
45 C.M.R. 218 (1972) this is an arguable conclusion. Nevertheless, in the instant opinion
COMA apparently accepted the trial judge's determination of a lack of military jurisdiction
to try the accused and assumed that the court-martial conviction was unconstitutional under
O'Callahanv. Parker.
64. See note 56 supra.
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directly to COMA, or those who had received the jurisdictional
sentence and now sought post-conviction relief outside the ordinary
appellate scheme, could obtain redress, while defendants who proceeded directly to judgment or who suffered post-conviction procedural errors without the requisite jurisdictional sentence would have
no judicial remedy within the military system.15 McPhail, however,
avoids preclusion of COMA's relief powers and abolishes the premium placed on interlocutory appeals because the jurisdiction to
grant extraordinary relief through the All Writs Act vests through
COMA's supervisory power over all courts-martial, and not through
the imposition or possible imposition of the jurisdictional sentence.
If the petitioner sufficiently alleges a substantial constitutional or
statutory violation, COMA's exercise of review and possible relief by
writ clearly is "in aid" of its supervisory jurisdiction over the courtmartial system.
COMA's recognition of its responsibility to insure the integrity
of court-martial proceedings beyond its duties narrowly defined by
the appellate provisions of the Code is a necessary and desirable
development in view of recent United States Supreme Court restrictions on federal court intervention in military justice." On the other
hand, COMA avoids usurpation of jurisdiction by relying on a
clearly manifested congressional intent and the accepted use of the
All Writs Act in federal appellate practice." COMA has not attempted to create judicial review powers over military proceedings
not pertaining to courts-martial, 8 nor has the court unjustifiably
altered the Code's scheme of appellate review by encouraging peti65.

In McPhail the court noted that the petitioner could have sought interlocutory relief

under Fleiner v. Koch, 19 C.M.A. 630 (1969), after the judge's accession but before conviction.
COMA therefore characterized the government's argument: "The Government contends that
it is too late for this Court to intercede." 24 C.M.A. at 307, 52 C.M.R. at 18.

66.

See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 758 (1975), in which the Court stated:

[J]udgments of the military court system remain subject in proper cases to collat-

eral impeachment. But implicit in the congressional scheme embodied in the Code is
the view that the military court system generally is adequate to and responsibly will
perform its assigned task. We think this congressional judgment must be respected and
that it must be assumed that the military court system will vindicate the servicemen's
constitutional rights. We have recognized this... in holding that federal courts normally

will not entertain habeas petitions by military prisoners unless all available military
remedies have been exhausted.
67. See notes 56 & 62 supra.
68. An earlier decision by COMA had denied review of a petitioner's decertification as
a trial judge by the JAG of the Air Force. In re Taylor, 12 C.M.A. 427, 31 C.M.R. 13 (1961).
In McPhail, the court thought it significant that the petition was denied in Taylor because
the relief sought was not in aid of its jurisdiction over court-martial processes. 24 C.M.A. at
307-08, 52 C.M.R. at 18-19.
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tions that seek to avoid the regular appellate process.69 McPhail
carefully reserves to COMA only those powers that serve to implement congressional desire for an effective military judicial system.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Ware's affirmation of the independence of the military judge
and McPhail's expansion of appellate relief powers represent the
"judicial activism" that commentators have observed in the present
COMA. 0 Although the court has requested congressional guidance
in limiting the role of the convening authority and delineating the
powers of the appellate courts to grant extraordinary relief,7 '
McPhail and Ware indicate COMA's willingness to erode obstacles
to appellate review as well as powers of the convening authority that
frustrate its understanding of congressional purposes embodied in
the Code. COMA's recent attempts to enhance the role of the judiciary within the military justice system do no violence to the Code's
balance of military discipline and civilian notions of fairness in
criminal proceedings. The cases do reflect, however, that COMA
will maintain an active supervisory role over military justice and a
careful eye on nonjudicial interference with and usurpation of judicial functions at the trial level.
STEPHEN

D.

GOODWIN

69. COMA cautioned that its extraordinary jurisdiction could not be invoked to address
all of the errors reviewable by ordinary appeal under article 67. 24 C.M.A. at 310, 52 C.M.R.
at 21. Relief from reversible errors in the large majority of cases not qualifying for regular
review by a CMR will be obtained properly from the JAG under article 69. See note 55 supra.
In cases like McPhail, however, when such relief was denied, COMA will not be precluded
from making the final judgment.
70. Silliman, The Supreme Court and Its Impact on the Court of Military Appeals, 18
A.F.L. REv. 81, 90 (1976).
71. 1974 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE U.S. COURT OF MILITARY APPEALS AND THE JUDGE ADVOCATES GENERAL OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE DEPARTMENT OF

TRANSPORTATION

6 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMA

at 7; 1972 COMA

REPORT,

supra, at 1, 2.

REPORT];

1973 COMA

REPORT

supra,
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Securities Law-Investment Adviser Fraud-A
Private Damages Remedy Is Implied Under
Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
I. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiffs, limited partners in an investment partnership,'
sought damages under section 2062 and rule 206(4)-11 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 from the partnership, its accountants, 4
and its general partners for failure to disclose in financial reports
substantial investment of partnership assets in unregistered securi1. Robert Abrahamson and Marjorie Abrahamson, husband and wife, were limited
partners in defendant investment partnership, Fleschner Becker Associates (FBA), from its
inception in 1965 until their withdrawal in 1970. Although the partners reorganized the
partnership in 1966 and 1968, at which time more general and limited partners entered the
partnership, the general partners actively invested the partnership assets and received compensation for their services throughout the existence of the partnership. Plaintiffs' initial joint
contribution was $150,000.
2. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client;
(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client;
(4) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative. The Commission shall, for the purposes of this paragraph (4) by
rules and regulations define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such
acts, practices, and courses of business as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative.
3. 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-i (1976) in relevant part states:
(a) It shall constitute a fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act, practice or
course of business within the meaning of the section 206(4) of the Act, for any investment
adviser, directly or indirectly, to publish, circulate or distribute any advertisement:
(5) Which contains any untrue statement of a material fact, or which is otherwise
false or misleading.
(b) For the purposes of this section the term "advertisement" shall include any
notice, circular, letter or other written communication addressed to more than one
person, or any notice or other announcement in any publication or by radio or television,
which offers (1) any analysis, report, or publication concerning securities, or which is to
be used in making any determination as to when to buy or sell any security, or which
security to buy or sell, or (2) any graph, chart, formula, or other device to be used in
making any determination as to when to buy or sell any security, or which security to
buy or sell, or (3) any other investment advisory service with regard to securities.
4. Harry Goodkin & Sons, certified public accountants, audited FBA's books and certified FBA's annual financial reports in 1966, 1967, and 1968. The Abrahamsons joined Harry
Goodkin as a knowing aider and abettor of the alleged fraud, pursuant to a similar express
SEC power to enjoin aiders and abettors. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970) (amending Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 89b-9(e) (1958)).
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ties .5Plaintiffs contended6 that the nondisclosure constituted fraudulent conduct under the Act by contravening the partnership's averred low risk investment policy and caused substantial financial
7
loss to plaintiffs by delaying their withdrawal from the partnership.
Defendants responded that they were not investment advisers
within the meaning of the Act and that plaintiffs realized no losses
compensable under the Act." On cross motions for summary judgment, the district court, which previously had recognized a private
damages action under section 206,1 dismissed the complaint for failure to allege compensable damages. ' ° On appeal, the Second Circuit
requested the parties to brief the threshold issue whether a private
damages action is implicit under section 206 of the Act," and held,
reversed and remanded for determination of damages. An implied
private cause of action for damages arises under section 206 of the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 when investment advisory reports
fail to disclose material facts and result in financial loss to limited
partners of an investment partnership. Abrahamson v. Fleschner,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,889 (2d
Cir., Feb. 25, 1977), petition for rehearinggranted (2d Cir., April 15,
1977).
5. Despite plaintiff's expressed concern for financial security and conservatism and the
recital of that policy in monthly and annual reports by defendants, those reports failed to
disclose the substantial investment in securities that were not registered with the SEC and
were subject to restrictions on their sale. Investment in the unregistered securities fluctuated
from 15% to 72% of the partnership's total portfolio from October 1967 through September
1968, and from 72% to 88% from October 1968 to September 1969.
6. Plaintiffs also claimed under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970), and rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1976), promulgated thereunder.
The district court and the instant court rejected this claim because the reconstitution of the
partnership in 1968 did not constitute the purchase or sale of a security and because the
alleged fraud's inducement not to sell plaintiffs' partnership interests did not constitute the
purchase or sale of a security. See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723,
737-38 (1975).
7. The plaintiffs learned of the investment in unregistered securities in an annual report
received in December 1969 or January 1970 and withdrew from the partnership at the next
possible opportunity pursuant to the partnership agreement, September 1970. Although Mr.
Abrahamson realized $156,097 in net profits and Mrs. Abrahamson realized $133,081.35, the
plaintiffs claimed damages of $454,979 and $799,821 respectively on the theory that they
would have withdrawn from the partnership in September 1968 had they known the true
investment posture of FBA.
8. Defendants also claimed that FBA was authorized by the partnership agreement to
purchase securities of any type and that plaintiffs, having access to FBA's books and records,
were charged with constructive knowledge of the investments.
9. Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (noted in 43 FORDHAM L. REv.493 (1974); 48 TEMP. L.Q. 433 (1975)); see text accompanying note 60 infra.
10. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 392 F. Supp. 740, 749 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The court held
that plaintiffs had not stated compensable damages under the Act since they had realized
significant profits on their investments. See note 7 supra.
11. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 537 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1975).
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II.

LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was one in a series of
pervasive securities laws 12 in which Congress proscribed fraudulent
conduct, but failed to provide the injured party with an express
private right of action to redress the fraud. Despite the absence of
explicit authorization, courts have implied private damages actions
from other securities statutes 13 based on the analyses derived from
the seminal decisions in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co." and J.I.
Case Co. v. Borak.'5 The district court in Kardon, relying on the
absence of an express congressional denial of a private remedy and
the "broad purpose" of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to regulate securities transactions and to eliminate fraudulent conduct,
implied on tort'6 and contract 7 theories a private remedy under
section 10(b) and rule 10b-5. For nearly twenty years, lower federal
courts relied on Kardon to infer private causes of action under the
securities laws. The Supreme Court adopted lines of analysis similar
to the Kardon rationale in Borak and concluded that the "broad
remedial purpose" of section 14(a) of the 1934 Act to protect inves12. The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was preceded by: Securities Act of 1933, 15
U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-77111 (1970);
Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1970); Trust Indenture
Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1970); and Investment Company Act of 1940, 15
U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to-52 (1970).
13. Implied actions have been found under the 1933 Act, Deckert v. Independence
Shares Corp., 311 U.S. 282 (1940); under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972); Superintendant of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404
U.S. 6 (1971); Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946); under §
14(a) of the 1934 Act, J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); under the 1935 Act,
Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944); and under
the Investment Company Act of 1940, Moses v. Burgin, 445 F.2d 369 (1st Cir. 1971); Herpich
v. Wallace, 430 F.2d 792 (5th Cir. 1970); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Taussig v. Wellington Fund, Inc., 313 F.2d 472 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 374 U.S. 806 (1963); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d
415 (2d Cir. 1961) (en banc).
14. 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa.1946).
15. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
16. 69 F. Supp. at 513-14. The court argued that § 10(b) created federal rights, the
infringement of which was remedial under the law of torts:
The violation of a legislative enactment by doing a prohibited act, or by failing to
do a required act, makes the actor liable for an invasion of an interest of another if:
(a) the intent of the enactment is exclusively or in part to protect an interest
of the other as an individual; and
(b) the interest invaded is one which the enactment is intended to protect
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS

§ 286 (1934).

17. 69 F. Supp. at 514. The court concluded that Congress must have intended to imply
a civil remedy for rescission and damages when it provided in § 29(b) of the 1934 Act that
contracts in violation of any provision of the Act shall be void. See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(b) (1970).
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tors from fraud in the issuance of proxies, the need for a supplement
to SEC enforcement, and the statutory grant of jurisdiction in section 27 "over all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty" created under the Act mandated an implied
right of action for damages under sections 14(a) and 27.18 The analyses in Kardon and Borak thus reflect the willing attitude of the
federal courts to provide private remedies under the antifraud sections of the federal securities statutes.
Subsequent to the expansive decisions in Kardon, Borak, and
their progeny,' 9 the Supreme Court enunciated guidelines in two
major cases outside the securities field that define the relevant considerations in implying private remedies from statutory language."
In National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. National Association of
Railroad Passengers2' (Amtrak), the Court reached a conclusion
contrary to Kardon by establishing a presumption against implied
private causes of action rebuttable only by substantial proof that
legislative history and congressional purpose manifest an affirmative congressional intent to create a private damages remedy.22 The
Supreme Court clarified its standards for determining whether a
private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly granting such
a remedy with the promulgation of four definitive criteria in Cort
v. Ash:23
First, is the plaintiff "one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute
was enacted," . . . that is, does the statut create a federal right in favor of
the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or
implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? . . . Third, is it
consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such
a remedy for the plaintiff? ... And finally, is the cause of action one tradition18. 377 U.S. at 430-31. Borak provides compelling evidence that jurisdictional grants
have been significant in the implication of private remedies under the securities statutes since
the Supreme Court framed the question in that case whether the jurisdiction section, § 27,
permits private parties to remedy frauds under the proxy section, § 14. See id. at 428.
19. See note 13 supra.
20. See Comment, PrivateRights of Action UnderAmtrak andAsh: Some Implications
for Implication, 123 U. PA. L. Rzv. 1392 (1975).
21. 414 U.S. 453 (1974). The Court in Amtrak held that the private party could not
enjoin discontinuance of railroad service prohibited by the Rail Passenger Act of 1970 because
the express language of the statute, the legislative history, and the congressional purpose
provide an exclusive remedy.
22. Id. at 458-61. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared, "When a
statute limits a thing to be done in a particular mode, it includes the negative of any other
mode." Id. at 458 (citing Botany Mills v. United States, 278 U.S. 282, 289 (1929)).
23. 422 U.S. 66(1975). In Ash the Court rejected a stockholder's derivative suit to enjoin
and to recover compensatory and punitive damages for a corporation's alleged violations of
the Federal Election Campaign Act, 18 U.S.C. § 610 (1970), during the 1972 presidential
election.
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ally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the States, so
that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal
law?"

The Amtrak presumption against implication and the rigorous analysis undertaken by the Court under each of the four Ash criteria
indicate a more restrictive judicial approach than the analytical
structure used in Kardon and Borak to imply private remedies when
express congressional authorization does not exist.
The Supreme Court's implementation of Amtrak and Ash in
the securities area has produced significant limitations on the implication of private causes of action to remedy fraudulent conduct. In
SecuritiesInvestor ProtectionCorp. v. Barbour25 (SIPC), the Court
relied on Amtrak in refusing to imply a private remedy for the
customer of a failing broker-dealer to compel the SIPC to recompense the investor's losses. The Court found that the legislative
history of the Act 5 indicated that the statute contemplated exclusive SEC enforcement, the implied remedy would be inconsistent
with the structure and purposes of the regulatory scheme, and the
statute lacked standards of conduct that a private action could
implement. In Piper v. Chris-CraftIndustries, Inc.,n the Court refused to imply a private remedy under section 14(e) of the 1934
Act,2 8 finding that application of the four-part Ash test demonstrated that unsuccessful tender offerors were not of the special class
Congress intended to benefit, that there was no manifestation of
legislative intent to provide tender offerors with a remedy,2 9 that an
implied damages action was unnecessary to effectuate the dominant
congressional purpose to protect investors, and that state remedies
were adequate for the tender offeror's recovery.30 The Court reiterated these themes one month later in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v.
Green31 when it considered a claim under section 10(b) of the 1934
24. 422 U.S. at 78.
25. 421 U.S. 412 (1975).
26. Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 78ggg(b) (1970).
27. 97 S. Ct. 926 (Feb. 23, 1977).
28. The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's decision to imply the cause of
action in this set of circumstances.
29. Interestingly, although the Court found no positive congressional intent to deny a
private remedy, it held that congressional silence is consistent with the Amtrak presumption.
Id. at 4192.
30. Id. at 4192-93. The instant court cited Piperfor the proposition that a private right
of action for damages should be implied under § 206 of the Advisers Act. Abrahamson v.
Fleschner, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 95,889, at 91,274 (2d Cir.,
Feb. 25, 1977), petition for rehearinggranted (2d Cir., Apr. 15, 1977). Clearly, Piperstands
for the opposite conclusion that a private remedy should not be implied under § 14(e) of the
1934 Act.
31. 97 S. Ct. 1292 (Mar. 23, 1977). As in Piper,the Supreme Court reversed the Second
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Act by minority shareholders alleging a breach of fiduciary duty
without deception or manipulation during an attempted merger. In
applying the Ash analysis, the Court determined that the intrinsic
fairness of a securities transaction was subsidiary to the dominant
congressional purpose of full disclosure under the 1934 Act and that
state corporation statutes provided a sufficient remedy. The application of Amtrak and Ash to the implication of private remedies
under the securities laws indicates a significant constriction of the
judicial willingness to expand the protection of the federal securities
statutes by private enforcement. The Court's requirement that legislative history manifest a congressional intent to permit private
enforcement of the statute and the Court's willingness to relegate
plaintiffs claiming under the federal securities statutes to state remedies are both important restrictions on the implication of a private
damages action under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
In addition to restricting the creation of implied private remedies, the Court also has limited previously recognized implied
causes of action in the securities field. The Court established in Blue
Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores32 that a plaintiff must be a
purchaser or seller to bring suit under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act
on the basis of a strict constuction of the statutory language and a
careful scrutiny of legislative intent and purpose. This requirement
thus limits recovery under section 10(b) and rule 10b-5 to actual
rather than speculative damages. Similarly, the requirement of
scienter for claims under section 10(b) in Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder3 3 provides another important limitation on the burgeoning caseload arising under the 1934 Act. Although the Court's restrictions on implied remedies under the 1934 Act are not directly
transferrable to a remedy under the Advisers Act, the restrictions
remeevidence a desire by the Court to constrict judicially created
34
dies for fraudulent conduct in securities transactions.
As ultimately enacted, the Investment Advisers Act of 1940
seeks to register and regulate on the federal level persons compensated for providing others with advice concerning the value of securities or the desirability of investing in, purchasing, or selling securities.35 The Act grants the SEC authority to enjoin or to recommend
Circuit's conclusion that rule 10b-5 extended to breaches of fiduciary duties of majority
stockholders to minority stockholders in a merger setting without misrepresentation or lack
of disclosure.
32. 421 U.S. 723, 733-49 (1975).
33. 96 S. Ct. 1375 (1976).
34. See Haimoff, Holmes Looks at Hochfelder and lOb-5, 32 Bus. LAW. 147, 174 (1976).
35. Investment Advisers Act of 1940 § 202(11), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(11) (1970).
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criminal prosecution" for any violation of two substantive provisions proscribing certain compensatory schemes in advisory contracts37 and certain fraudulent transactions.3 Attached as title II to
the bill that created the Investment Company Act of 1940, the
SEC's initial draft of the proposed Advisers Act 39 resulted from an
SEC study of abuses in the investment trust industry.'" The rather
broadly drawn SEC draft of the bill encountered strong opposition
from investment advisers who argued that the bill was far more
extensive than it appeared,4 that it had exceeded the original SEC
concept of a compulsory census of advisers,42 and that it had been
appended hastily to title I without adequate demonstration of
abuse. 13 As the result of a compromise between the industry and the
SEC accommodating these objections,44 Congress enacted a second
draft of the proposed legislation45 that represented a delicate balance between the interests of investors and advisers and that refined
and narrowed the expansive provisions of the SEC draft. Throughout the drafting process, the registration of advisers" received major
emphasis in order to achieve the stated congressional purpose of
protecting the public and investors from "tipsters and touts." 7 A
36. Id. § 209(e), 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1970).
37. Id. § 205, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-5 (1970).
38. Id. § 206, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1970).
39. S. 3580, 76th Cong., 3d Seass., reprinted in Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm.
of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 76th Cong., 3d Seass., pt. 2, at 1 (1940); H.R.
8935, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. (1940).
40. U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, INVESTMENT TRUSTS AND INVESTMENT
COMPANIES: INVESTMENT COUNSEL, INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, INVESTMENT SUPERVISORY AND

INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICES, H.R. Doc. No. 477, 76th Cong., 2d Sess. (1939). The study
was made pursuant to § 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §
79z-4 (1970).
41. Hearings on S. 3580 Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Banking and
Currency, supra note 39, at 718, 759. Adviser Robert Loomis noted:
On the face of it, title II appear[s] rather mild and innocuous and it is only after careful
study of it and also a study of what is implicit in its present requirements, that I have
decided it is drastic enough to indicate that someone must have thought the situation
pretty bad.
Id. at 761. The implications to which Mr. Loomis referred were the sections of S. 3580 that
the industry sought to eliminate.
42. Id. at 712.
43. Id. at 712, 715.
44. S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Seass. 2, 12 (1940); H.R. REP.No. 2639, 76th Cong.,
3d Seass. 10 (1940).
45. S. 4108, 76th Cong., 3d Seass. (1940); H.R. 10065, 76th Cong., 3d Sess., reprinted in
Hearings on H.R. 10065 Before a Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 76th Cong., 3d Seass. 1 (1940). H.R. 10065 was the draft passed by Congress.
46. Compare H.R. 10065, supra note 45, § 203 with S. 3580, supra note 39, § 203.
47. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Seass. 28 (1940); see SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963), in which the Court determined that the impetus
for legislation was to prevent the abuses that had contributed to the 1929 stock market crash
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series of deletions and additions, however, reflects the significant
industry input into the second draft and suggests an underlying
purpose of preventing disruption in the industry." Designed to protect advisers' clients and potential clients against fraudulent conduct, section 206 remained essentially unchanged throughout the
1940 legislative process, 4 although the 1960 and 1970 amendments
augmented the SEC enforcement powers of the section2? Significantly, the second draft deleted the broad statement of policy that
the SEC had designed to guide the courts in the construction of the
Act. 5' Furthermore, the second draft provided its own definitions
and to substitute a policy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor. The Court
spoke only to the issue of SEC injunctive enforcement expressly provided in § 209 in that
case when it noted that § 206 had been intended to prevent frauds upon investors throughout
the Act's legislative history. 375 U.S. at 186-95.
48. Congress subsequently recognized the limited scope of the Act in 1960:
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 was passed as title II of the bill of which title I
was the Investment Company Act. Unlike other Federal securities statutes, it has few
substantive or regulatory provisions. Modeled somewhat on the broker-dealer registration provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it resembles a continuing census
of the Nation's investment advisers.
S. REp. No. 1760, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
3502, 3503.
49. Compare H.R. 10065, supra note 45, § 206 with S. 3580, supra note 3, § 206.
50. The 1960 amendments to the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 granted the SEC
rulemaking power to define fraud under § 206 and power to inspect books and records, and
extended SEC enforcement under § 206 to all investment advisers dealing in interstate
commerce whether they are registered under the Act or not. S. REP. No. 1760, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 4, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3502, 3503. The 1970 amendments added § 206A, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a, which permits the SEC to exempt classes of advisers from its rulemaking powers. S. REP. No. 91-184, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 42, reprinted in
[1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 4897, 4941-42. Although Congress clearly strengthened
the enforcement powers of the SEC to remedy any enforcement deficiencies, Congress did not
add any provision for private enforcement.
51. S. 3580, supra note 39, § 202 provided:
Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and report of the Securities and
Exchange Commission made pursuant to section 30 of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, and facts otherwise disclosed and ascertained, it is hereby declared
that the national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected(1) when investors are unable to obtain adequate information as to the
activities, practices, ability, training, and integrity of investment advisers, their
affiliated persons, and employees;
(2) when persons of proven lack of integrity in financial matters are permitted to engage in business as investment advisers;
(3) when the compensation of investment advisers is based upon profitsharing contracts and other contingent arrangements conducive to excessive
speculation and trading; or
(4) when the business of investment advisers is so conducted as to defraud
or mislead investors, or to enable such advisers to relieve themselves of their
fiduciary obligations to their clients.
It is hereby declared that the policy and purposes of this title, in accordance with which

19771

RECENT CASES

and jurisdictional requirements rather than incorporating these provisions by reference to title I as the original SEC draft had proposed. 52 In enacting section 214,11 Congress omitted the "boiler
plate" SEC jurisdiction by excising any reference to "actions at
law" to enforce "any duty or liability created" under the Act. Congress did not seek to alter this omission in 1960 or 1970 when it
created additional jurisdiction in title I," and an amendment
supplying this omitted language failed in Congress in 1976,11 but has
the provisions of this title shall be interpreted, are to mitigate and, so far as is presently
practicable to eliminate the abuses enumerated in this section.
The purpose of including the findings of policy was to aid the courts in their construction of
the statute. Hearingson S. 3580, supra note 41, at 176. The rescission of that section indicates
a narrowing of the original bill.
52. S. 3580, supra note 39, § 203 (1940). Section 203 of the SEC draft purported to
incorporate by reference § 40 of title I of the bill, which in turn incorporated § 25 of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79y (1970).
53. Section 214, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-14 (1970), provides:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction
of violations of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, and,
concurrently with State and Territorial courts, of all suits in equity to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or the rules, regulations, or orders thereunder. Any criminal
proceeding may be brought in the district wherein any act or transaction constituting
the violation occurred. Any suit or action to enjoin any violation of this subchapter or
rules, regulations, or orders thereunder, may be brought in any such district or in the
district wherein the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts business, and process in such
cases may be served in any district of which the defendant is an inhabitant or transacts
business or wherever the defendant may be found. Judgments and decrees so rendered
shall be subject to review as provided in sections 225 and 347 of Title 28, and section 7,
as amended, of the Act entitled "An Act to establish a court of appeals for the District
of Columbia," approved February 9, 1893. No costs shall be assessed for or against the
Commission in any proceeding under this subchapter brought by or against the Commission in any court.
Each of the preceding securities regulations provided for both actions in equity and at
law. See Securities Act of 1933 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 77v (1970); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970); Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 § 25, 15 U.S.C. §
79y (1970); Trust Indenture Act of 1939 § 322, 15 U.S.C. § 77vvv (1970); Investment Company
Act of 1940 § 44, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-43 (1970). Although § 14 was one of several sections deemed
"generally comparable" to similar provisons in the Investment Company Act, the differences
are manifest.
54. In 1970 Congress amended the Investment Company Act to provide for the civil
liability of investment advisers who advise investment companies to the extent of a breach
of fiduciary duty with respect to compensation for services. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (1970) (amending Investment Company Act of 1940 § 36, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5 (1958)). Apparently, Congress
knew how to provide for the civil liability of investment advisers when it desired to do so.
55. S. 2849, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. § 6 (1976) provides:
The district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any territory or
other place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have jurisdiction of
violations of this title or the rules, regulations, orders thereunder, and, concurrently with
State and territorial courts, of all suits in equity and actions at law brought to enforce
any liability or duty created by, or to enjoin any violation of, this title or the rules,
regulations, or orders thereunder.
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been reintroduced in the 95th Congress."
Although private section 206 claims for damages have been
presented to the courts frequently, most decisions prior to 1974
granted relief on the strength of alternative claims (usually under
the 1934 Act) or simply omitted discussion of the possibility of relief
under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940. 57 The district courts
directly addressing the issue since 1974 have divided in their judgments. In Greenspan v. Del Toro,5 8the court rejected the implication of a private damages action, arguing that the omission of
"actions at law" from the jurisdictional requirements of section 214
evidenced congressional intent to deny such a remedy. Similarly,
the district court in Gammage v. Roberts, Scott & Co.5" reasoned
that without an explicit statutory condemnation of fraudulent conduct and a general grant of jurisdiction such a remedy should not
be recognized judicially. Relying on congressional intent to protect
investors, the court in Bolger v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath &
Horwath" reached a contrary conclusion and advanced three exS. 2849, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in Hearings on S. 2849 Before the Subcomm. on
Securitiesof the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
3 (1976). The amendment was slipped between proposed amendments to strengthen qualifications of advisers and financial responsibility. Although the bill was reported out of the
Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Committee, S. REP. No. 910, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1976), the bill failed to come to a vote in 1976. The jurisdiction amendment was not
discussed significantly at hearings, but Professor Loss of Harvard did draw an important
distinction before the Committee. He asserted that the addition of the proposed language
would not create a private damages remedy, but merely would facilitate its implication in
the courts. Hearings on S. 2849 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the Senate Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, supra, at 232-33.
56. H.R. 2105, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 7 (1977).
57. Girsh v. Jepson, 521 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1975); Competitive Assoc., Inc. v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 516 F.2d 811 (2d Cir. 1975); Kutner v. Gofen & Glossberg
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,109 (7th Cir. 1971); Kauffman v.
Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727 (3d Cir. 1970); Index Fund, Inc. v. Hagopian, 417 F. Supp.
738 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Carroll v. Bear, Steams & Co., 416 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Kusner v. First Pa. Corp., 395 F. Supp. 276 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Competitive Capital Corp. v.
Yamada [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,617 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Selzer v. Bank of Bermuda Ltd., 385 F. Supp. 415 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fox v. Prudent Resources
Trust, 382 F. Supp. 81 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Jones Memorial Trust v. Tsai Inv. Services, Inc., 367
F. Supp. 491 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Young v. Seaboard Corp., 360 F. Supp 490 (D. Utah 1973);
Courtland v. Walston & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Skydell v. Mates, 59 F.R.D.
297 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Schlusselberg v. Werly [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. RaP.
(CCH) 92,012 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
58. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 95,488 (S.D. Fla. 1974).
59. [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. Sac. L. RaP. (CCH) 94,761 (S.D. Cal. 1974).
60. 381 F. Supp. 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). Bolger has been followed in subsequent cases.
Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Vesco [Current] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 95,644 (S.D.N.Y. 1976);
Jones v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 409 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y.
1975).
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planations for the implication of a damages remedy despite the
omission of "actions at law" from the federal jurisdiction in section
214. First, the court reasoned that the jurisdiction granted over
"violations" of the Act' does not apply exclusively to criminal
cases, but also to actions at law. Secondly, the court argued that
Congress omitted the "actions at law" language because the Act
does not provide expressly any action at law. Finally, the Bolger
court emphasized that the Senate and House Reports stated that
section 214 of the Advisers Act was comparable to a similar provision in the companion Investment Company Act that provided jurisdiction over actions in equity and at law. In Angelakis v. Churchill Management Corp.6" the court relied on the Bolger analysis of
congressional purpose and possible bases of jurisdiction to imply a
private remedy under section 206 and criticized the Gammage court
for relying solely on statutorily proscribed conduct and jurisdictional power in its consideration of implying a remedy. In view of
these widely divergent district court opinions, the instant opinion
is important as the first circuit court decision on the question
whether a private damages remedy is implicit in section 206.63
I.

THE INSTANT OPINION

The instant court 4 initially determined that defendants as paid
providers of investment advice in monthly reports and as managers
of investment funds for compensation qualified as investment advisers under the Act. 5 Noting that private remedies had been implied under other securities regulations, 6 the court implemented the
four Ash criteria in its consideration of section 206.67 Initially, the
court held that plaintiffs, as advisers' clients under section 206, were
members of the class for whose benefit the Act was intended. Next,
the court found that the absence of explicit evidence that Congress
ever considered a private damages remedy when it enacted the in61. See note 53 supra.
62. [1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,285 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
63. But see Brouk v. Managed Funds, Inc., 286 F.2d 901 (8th Cir. 1961), vacated as
moot, 369 U.S. 424 (1962). The vacated judgment refused to recognize an implied private
remedy under the Advisers Act and the Investment Company Act. The Circuit later disapproved of the Investment Company Act decision. Greater Iowa Corp. v. McLendon, 378 F.2d
783, 793 (8th Cir. 1967).
64. Judge Timbers wrote the majority decision and was joined by Judge Mansfield.
65. In so holding, the instant court inferred from legislative intent that general partners
of investment partnerships as managers of partnership assets were investment advisers
within the meaning of the Act.
66. See note 13 supra.
67. See text accompanying note 24 supra.
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stant legislation rendered an examination of legislative intent inconclusive, but did not militate against judicial implication of a
private remedy. The majority then examined legislative purpose,
the third Ash criterion, to ascertain implicit legislative intent. The
court determined that protection of the public and investors from
malpractice by those employed to advise clients compels recognition
of private enforcement by federal courts. In support of this conclusion, the court relied on the inadequacy of SEC enforcement resources to promote the effective regulation of securities intended by
Congress, the congressional intent to provide an implied damages
action in the Act as ascertained by the court under the Kardon
contract theory, 8 and the insignificance of the jurisdictional omission of "actions at law" to the court's power to fashion a remedy.
With respect to the jurisdictional problem, the court advanced
many of the Bolger arguments, asserting that the omitted language
would have been superfluous since the Act provided no express action at law, that the jurisdiction of the Advisers Act was comparable
to the Investment Company Act, and that courts have never relied
on the jurisdictional language to imply remedies in other securities
cases. 9 The instant court thus held that an implied private remedy
exists under section 206. The court concluded its analysis by declining to superimpose the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller limitation on the remedy it had created since the Advisers Act does not
contain the same express requirement and since Congress intended
to protect advisers' clients regardless of whether they purchase or
sell shares. It then recommended a formula to measure damages it
deemed compensable and ascertainable on remand. 0
A vigorous dissenting opinion7 1 challenged the majority's conclusion that section 206 contains an implied private right of action
for damages and emphasized significant distinctions between the
Advisers Act and other federal securities statutes in which courts
have recognized implied private remedies." The dissent contended
that the fundamental approach of effecting a compulsory census of
68. As in the 1934 Act construed in Kardon, the Advisers Act provides: "Every contract
made in violation of any provision of [the Act]... shall be void. ..
" 15 U.S.C. 80b-15(b)
(1970).
69. See note 18 supra.
70. The three standards were: (1) determine at what point defendants' representations
became fraudulent due to the increase in investment in unregistered securities; (2) compute
total net losses on all holdings in unregistered securities after that date; and (3) determine
which holdings were inconsistent with a conservative investment posture.
71. Judge Gurfein wrote the dissenting opinion.
72. See note 13 supra.
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investment advisers by their registration and the substantial industry contribution to the final draft of the Act indicated a cautious,
limited congressional approach. Arguing that the majority's finding
of congressional silence did not suffice to evoke implication under
Amtrak or SIPC,7 3 the dissent additionally found an implicit legislative intent to deny a private damages action under section 206 since
Congress chose to omit jurisdiction over actions at law from the Act
while it included such a provision in all other securities regulations. 7 Furthermore, the dissent propounded that this implicit legislative intent to deny a private right of action for damages combined with the congressional purpose to avoid disruption of the
investment advisory industry outweighed the protection of investors, the congressional purpose heavily relied upon by the majority.
Finally, the dissent concluded that the absence of a purchaser-seller
limitation in section 206 and the majority's rejection of judicial
application of that limit to section 206 rendered the computation of
damages speculative under the Act. In the dissent's opinion, such
policy considerations militated against unwise judicial implication
of a private remedy without limitations.
IV.

COMMENT

As the first decision by a circuit court to imply a private remedy
for damages under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act and
the most fully reasoned decision on the issue yet, the instant opinion
creates an important new federal cause of action in favor of clients
and potential clients of investment advisers. Such clients need no
longer rely on the technical requirements of common law fraud and
deceit 75 or on state investment adviser antifraud statutes 7 to recover
damages for fraudulent advisers' conduct prohibited by section 206
and rule 206(4)-i. As the Supreme Court restricts the boundaries of
recovery under the 1934 Act with decisions such as Blue Chip
Stamps and Hochfelder, the instant court's creation of a federal
remedy under the Advisers Act provides an alternative form of relief
for investors aggrieved by allegedly fraudulent conduct in their se73.

See notes 21 & 25, supra and accompanying text.

74.

See note 52 supra.

75. The common law requirements for fraud and deceit include: (1) a misrepresentation
of a material fact by defendant; (2) scienter; (3) reliance by plaintiff; and (4) actual damage
to the plaintiff. 3 Loss, SECURmES RGULATION 1628 (2d ed. 1961); see The Regulation of

Investment Advisers, 14 STAN. L. REv. 827, 832 (1962).
76. Thirty-five states currently have statutes that require registration and/or prohibit
fraudulent activities. Hearings, supra note 55, at 19-26. See also 1 Loss, SEcunrrms
REGULAMON 47-48 (2d ed. 1961); 14 STAN. L. REv., supra note 75, at 833.
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curities transactions."
Nevertheless, the instant opinion misapplies and confuses the
analysis set forth in Ash in implying a private damages action under
the Advisers Act. If one accepts the majority's analysis that the
general partners of an investment partnership are investment advisers, the court's classification of plaintiffs as members of the special
class that section 206 seeks to benefit is correct. The instant court,
however, glosses over the second Ash criterion, legislative intent, by
claiming that congressional silence is indicative of nothing. Instead
it focuses on legislative purpose and thereby confuses separate analysis of the second and third criteria. The court's conclusion that it
can imply a private cause of action despite the absence of legislative
intent to permit the coexistence of a private remedy and statutorily
provided enforcement contradicts the Supreme Court's determinations in Amtrak, SIPC, and Piperthat congressional silence does not
rebut the presumption against implication of a private remedy but
serves to reinforce it. In addition to overlooking the presumption
against implication established by Amtrak, the instant court, in
ascertaining legislative intent in the instant case, accords insufficient weight to the changes effected between the first and second
drafts of the bill. The deletions in section 214 of "actions at law"
and "duties and liabilities created" require more significant attention than the instant court attaches. Contrary to the court's assertions, previous decisions implying private remedies under other securities statutes have relied on such jurisdictional grants."8 Additionally, the majority's argument that the language is superfluous
because the Act created no express private remedy is intrinsically
weak and tenuous. The deliberate recission of that language from
the first draft of the bill more fairly supports the dissent's conclusion that Congress clearly intended no private remedy under the Act
without further study. The majority's interpretation of the omission
also undercuts its own conclusion that Congress intended to provide
a damages remedy under the Kardon contract theory7 9 since Congress surely would have provided jurisdiction for actions at law if it
intended to create a private damages remedy for contracts voided
under the Act. Furthermore, the majority fails to consider the
broader context of the legislative history of the Act, particularly the
second draft's deletion of the broad policy objectives designed to aid
77. Interestingly, the instant court could not justify recovery on the plaintiffs' claim
under the 1934 Act. See note 6 supra.
78. See note 18 supra.
79. See note 68 supra.
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the court's construction of the Act and Congress's willingness to
conform the draft to the narrower objectives advanced by the industry. While Congress did provide for adviser liability under the Investment Company Act in 1970, Congress examined the enforcement provisions of section 206 in 1960 and 1970 and chose to augment the SEC's enforcement power rather than create a private
remedy. Such an attempt to provide jurisdictional authority to
imply a private damages remedy under the Advisers Act failed in
Congress in 1976. Even the proposed amendment pending before
Congress would only permit implication by strengthening the evidence of legislative intent; it would not provide expressly for private
enforcement. In the context of Amtrak, Ash, SIPC, Piper, and
Green, the majority's dismissal of these considerations does not
appear to be consistent with the Supreme Court's requirement of
affirmative legislative intent that a private remedy should coexist
with the statutorily prescribed enforcement. Similarly, the court's
analysis of legislative purpose, the third Ash standard, accounts
only for the protection of investors and ignores the concommitant
purposes of registering advisers as the device to protect investors,
of avoiding industry disruption, and of restraining imposition of
financial liability under section 206 without further study by Congress. Moreover, the court fails to consider that the primary congressional purpose in enacting section 206 may not have been to provide
a cause of action for adviser fraud, but rather to define adviser
conduct for which registration would be denied or revoked by the
SEC. Such an interpretation is consistent with the protection of
investors through the registration of advisers, the primary thrust of
the Act.
Finally, the court chooses to ignore the fourth Ash criterion, the
adequacy of state statutory and common law remedies to compensate investors for fraudulent adviser activity, by stressing the importance attached to the federal regulation propagated by the Act.
This analysis obviates the entire purpose of the criterion because
Ash contemplates federal regulation while still considering state
remedies. In the instant case, plaintiffs could have soilght a remedy
under state partnership law by claiming that the partners breached
their fiduciary duty to disclose information."0 On a more general
level of the adviser-client relationship, a common law action for
fraud and deceit may not be inadequate to reimburse a client for
an investor's fraudulent misrepresentation or nondisclosure. While
80.

See UNmoIm PARTNERSHIP ACT

§

20.
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a fiduciary relationship ordinarily has not existed when courts have
implied remedies under other securities acts, the existence of such
a relationship between an adviser and his client eases the burden
of proof in a common law fraud and deceit action to recover damages
for adviser fraud. Furthermore, because common law fraud and deceit demand adherence to various technical requirements such as
reliance and actual damages, the common law action provides inherent limitations on recovery that a judicially implied private
cause of action under section 206 eliminates.
The instant court's establishment of a broad private damages
remedy under section 206 will require extensive litigation to provide
necessary limitations on the cause of action. Commentators have
discussed the problems that the courts will encounter in defining the
contours of the right of action, including the plaintiff class, the
defendant class, causation and reliance, and scienter 8 ' Since Congress never contemplated a private damages action under section
206, the courts must define the parameters of the investment
clients' remedy without the guidance of legislative history, congressional intent, or delimiting statutory language on which the Supreme Court relied so heavily in Blue Chip Stamps and Hochfelder.
Congress designed section 206 for equitable enforcement by the
SEC, which requires far less technical proof than common law fraud
and deceit.2 The creation of a private remedy based on the same
broad langauge intended for equitable enforcement necessarily
lacks natural perimeters. The potential financial liability of investment advisers without limitations is manifest. The majority's rejection of the application of the Blue Chip Stamps purchaser-seller
limitation to section 206 invites speculative claims. Clients or potential clients (however defined) may simply await market developments and then contend that the investment advice deceptively
encouraged investment in a losing speculation, as in the instant
case, or precluded investment in stock whose value subsequently
soars. The Blue Chip Stamps Court feared that just such a result
would encourage fraud on the investor's or client's part. Furthermore, if courts later reject the application of Hochfelder to the remedy created under the Advisers Act as the instant court refused to
apply Blue Chip Stamps, negligent or unknowing inclusion or exclusion of some fact in investment advisory reports may constitute an
81. Note, Private Causes of Action Under Section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act,
74 MIcH. L. REv. 308 (1975).
82. S. REP. No. 1760, 86TH CONG., 2D SESS. 8, reprinted in [1960] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3509.
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activity that is "fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative," and therefore may be actionable under section 206 despite the absence of
scienter, a traditional requirement of fraud. Although the scope of
investment advisers' financial liability must be determined by
future litigation, the delineation of the extent of that liability could
be expressed more properly and fully by state legislatures or by
Congress after appropriate study and reflection.
The distinctions that limit the Advisers Act and differentiate
it from other securities laws in which courts have implied private
damages remedies and the recent Supreme Court decisions in
Amtrak, SIPC, and Piper that militate against the implication of
private remedies absent compelling evidence to the contrary establish insufficient sources and limitations to imply such a right of
action under section 206. While it is initially an attractive policy to
arm investors with new weapons to combat fraud in their securities
dealings, the wisdom and prudence of such a policy is questonable
under section 206 of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940.
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